

**Working Paper  
Volume 2021 Number 549**

# **Donor Action in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of CDIP and AAWAZ**

---

**Ayesha Khan and Komal Qidwai**

**March 2021**

The Institute of Development Studies (IDS) delivers world-class research, learning and teaching that transforms the knowledge, action and leadership needed for more equitable and sustainable development globally.

Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) is an international research programme which explores how social and political action can contribute to empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict, and violent settings, with a particular focus on Egypt, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan.

Led by the Institute of Development Studies, A4EA is being implemented by a consortium which includes: the Accountability Research Center, the Collective for Social Science Research, the Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives, Itad, Oxfam GB, and the Partnership for African Social and Governance Research. It is funded with UK aid from the UK government (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office – FCDO, formerly DFID). The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the official policies of our funder.

Produced as part of:



© Institute of Development Studies 2021

Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 549  
 Donor Action in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of CDIP and AAWAZ  
 Ayesha Khan and Komal Qidwai  
 March 2021

First published by the Institute of Development Studies in March 2021  
 ISSN: 2040-0209 ISBN: 978-1-78118-766-1  
 DOI: [10.19088/IDS.2021.025](https://doi.org/10.19088/IDS.2021.025)

Suggested citation: Khan, A. and Qidwai, K. (2021) *Donor Action in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of CDIP and AAWAZ*, IDS Working Paper 549, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, DOI:[10.19088/IDS.2021.025](https://doi.org/10.19088/IDS.2021.025)

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

This paper is funded with UK aid from the UK government (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office – FCDO, formerly DFID). The opinions are the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of IDS or the UK government.



This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited and any modifications or adaptations are indicated.

Available from:

Institute of Development Studies, Library Road  
 Brighton, BN1 9RE, United Kingdom  
 +44 (0)1273 915637  
[ids.ac.uk](https://ids.ac.uk)

IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England  
 Charity Registration Number 306371  
 Charitable Company Number 877338

**Working Paper**  
**Volume 2021 Number 549**

# **Donor Action in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of CDIP and AAWAZ**

---

**Ayesha Khan and Komal Qidwai**  
**March 2021**

# Donor Action in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of CDIP and AAWAZ

**Ayesha Khan and Komal Qidwai**  
**March 2021**

## Summary

This paper analyses findings from a study of the Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan (CDIP) and AAWAZ Voice and Accountability programmes, both funded by the UK government. The study is a contribution to the A4EA Research Programme workstream 'Unpacking Donor Action'. It is based on a secondary literature review, analysis of programme documents, and qualitative interviews with individuals who worked with these programmes at various levels. The analysis explores the interaction between the two programmes to argue they produced strong synergies as an outcome of their adaptive programming approach. The synergising took place under conditions of growing constraints on civic society and the democratic process during the programme life cycles. The paper concludes that the beneficial interaction effects were an outcome of strategic partnerships with a common implementing agency (DAI) and deep engagement with civil society organizations, but without empowered local government and on-going donor support the empowerment effects are difficult to sustain.

## Keywords

Pakistan, democracy, DFID [FCDO], adaptive programming, interaction effects, AAWAZ, CDIP, empowerment, accountability.

## Authors

**Ayesha Khan** is Director at the Collective for Social Science Research in Karachi. She researches gender and development, social policy and conflict/refugee issues in the region. She is author of *The Women's Movement in Pakistan: Activism, Islam and Democracy* (2018). Her recent research based on studies conducted as part of A4EA has been published in *Feminist Dissent*, *Contemporary South Asia*, *IDS Bulletin* and *Asian Affairs*.

**Komal Qidwai** worked at the Collective for Social Science Research as a Research Assistant and is currently a Fulbright Scholar pursuing an MA in Sociology at the University of South Florida.

# Contents

---

<b>Acronyms</b>	<b>9</b>
<hr/>	
<b>1. Introduction</b>	<b>11</b>
<hr/>	
<b>2. Background</b>	<b>14</b>
<hr/>	
<b>3. The donor environment</b>	<b>20</b>
<hr/>	
<b>4. The case for comparative analysis of programme interaction effects</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>4.1 AAWAZ</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>4.2 Consolidating democracy in Pakistan</b>	<b>28</b>
<hr/>	
<b>5. Methodology</b>	<b>29</b>
<hr/>	
<b>6. Sub-national comparison</b>	<b>31</b>
<hr/>	
<b>7. Programme design and political analysis</b>	<b>33</b>
<b>7.1 Theories of Change</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>7.2 The role of consortium partners</b>	<b>40</b>
<hr/>	
<b>8. Empowerment and accountability</b>	<b>42</b>
<hr/>	
<b>9. Interaction effects as adaptive programming</b>	<b>49</b>
<hr/>	
<b>10. Monitoring and evaluating empowerment and accountability</b>	<b>53</b>
<hr/>	
<b>11. Negotiating shrinking civic space</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>11.1 Adapting to risk and security concerns</b>	<b>60</b>

---

<b>12.</b>	<b>Impact on context and actors for empowerment and accountability</b>	<b>61</b>
<hr/>		
<b>13.</b>	<b>Conclusion</b>	<b>64</b>
<hr/>		
<b>Annexe 1</b>		<b>66</b>
<hr/>		
<b>Annexe 2</b>		<b>69</b>
<hr/>		
<b>Annexe 3</b>		<b>70</b>
<hr/>		
<b>References</b>		<b>71</b>

**Figures**

Figure 7.1 AAWAZ theory of change	38
Figure 7.2 CDIP theory of change	39
Figure 8.1 AAWAZ organogram	44
Figure 8.2 CDIP organogram	46
Figure 9.1 Theory of action in AAWAZ and CDIP	51

**Tables**

Table 2.1. Pakistan's development ranking by global index	15
Table 2.2 Pakistan scores on World Democracy Index	18
Table 4.1 AAWAZ and CDIP overview	23
Table 4.2 DFID (FCDO) administered programmes in Pakistan	24
Table 6.1 Characteristics of districts paired for comparison	31
Table 7.1 Changes in AAWAZ output 2 indicators	37
Table 10.1 AAWAZ output indicators	54
Table 10.2 CDIP output indicators	57
Table A1.1 Donor programmes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab	66
Table A2.1 List and number of interviews	69

## Acronyms

AAWAZ	Voice and Accountability Programme
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AF	Aurat Foundation
CAR	Context, Action, Result
CDIP	Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan Programme
CNIC	Computerised National Identity Card
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
DAI	Development Alternatives International
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DVEC	District Voter Education Committee
ECP	Election Commission of Pakistan
EU	European Union
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UK)
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FCVAS	Fragile, Conflict- and Violence-Affected Settings
GDP	Gross Development Product
GEP	Gender Equality Programme
GoPK	Government of Pakistan
HDI	Human Development Index
IRF	Innovation and Research Fund
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
MRV	Mobile Registration Van
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
NOCs	No Objection Certificates
PARR	Programme Analysis, Research and Results
PEA	Political Economy Analysis
PML (N)	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif)
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf
PTM	Pashtoon Tahaffuz Movement
RP	Resource Person (Aagahi Centre)
SAP-PK	South Asia Partnership Pakistan
SELP	Strengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes

SERP	Support to Electoral Reforms in Pakistan
SNG	Subnational Governance Programme
SPO	Strengthening Participatory Organisations
STAEP	Supporting Transparency, Accountability & Electoral Processes in Pakistan
ToC	Theory of Change
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Population
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

# 1. Introduction

This paper is an analysis of the interaction effects between two programmes funded by the UK government and implemented through the former Department for International Development (DFID), now the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in Pakistan. These are the AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme and the Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan (CDIP) programme. Fox (2020) has argued that international development projects may have ‘contradictory effects on countervailing power for the excluded’, in that certain project measures may conflict with others. With this conceptualisation in mind, we argue that these two programmes interacted to produce strong synergies in their effects on the excluded. This developed as an outcome of their adaptive programming approach,<sup>1</sup> which allowed AAWAZ to respond to findings on the ground and CDIP to engage with the former’s structure to valuable effect. This synergising took place under conditions of growing constraints on civic society and the democratic process in Pakistan during the programme life cycles.

In addressing the core research question of how social and political action for empowerment and accountability is enabled and supported by donors working in specific fragile, conflict- and violence-affected settings (FCVAS), we asked:

*How did DFID’s analysis and approaches in designing, implementing and monitoring initiatives for empowerment and accountability in FCVAS relate the two concepts, and how did they document and analyse the contribution from the two programmes under comparison?*

Both AAWAZ and CDIP were born out of a political economy analysis (PEA) of Pakistan’s context. The programmes envisioned similar outcomes and impact with respect to strengthening democracy by making it more inclusive (AAWAZ) and more accountable to citizens (CDIP). CDIP’s Output 4 in its logframe, the expansion of democratic space overlapped most directly with AAWAZ’s Output 1, women better able to participate in politics and public spaces. Both worked in successful partnership with leading advocacy and development NGOs which have been operating in Pakistan since the 1980s with an extensive track record of organising communities to advocate with government for increased citizens’ empowerment and the accountability of state institutions. The values and experience of these partners informed the programme design and enabled its community outreach.

---

1 For more information on the adaptive programming approach see research from A4EA’s first phase (Christie and Green 2019).

The two DFID-administered programmes were consistent in their understanding and articulation of empowerment and accountability. This consistency was enhanced through a shared emphasis on gender empowerment to achieve programme goals, a shared use of Development Alternatives International (DAI) as an implementing partner which in turn worked with NGOs that shared the same vision of a participatory citizen-state compact. Both programmes used the same CAR (context, action, result) framework to measure voice and accountability.

*How did the programmes interact with one another and build partnerships with other key actors involved in empowerment and accountability, was there a discernible synergy and/or conflict in their roles?*

We find the interaction effects between AAWAZ and CDIP are a compelling example of adaptive programming in a fragile social and political context. DAI worked closely with donor staff to adapt programming strategies on the ground, and strong communication channels with community and NGO partnerships informed this process. When CDIP began, after AAWAZ was well underway, it was ideally positioned to build on AAWAZ's existing partnerships to meet its goals. Further, both programmes used their monitoring and evaluation systems to document and analyse whether and how their activities contributed to empowerment and accountability. DAI's adaptive approach responding to inputs from consortium partners and field staff led to key changes in the design of AAWAZ.

*What was DFID's impact on the local context and local actors – how did the programmes enable 'an enabling environment' for social and political action in support of empowerment and accountability?*

During the programmes' cycles civic spaces came under increasing state scrutiny and control, yet the programmes persisted towards fostering an enabling environment for social and political action in support of empowerment and accountability. Through their partnerships with non-state actors in civil society and establishment of citizen's forums, they helped to off-set traditional elite capture of voice and accountability in local settings. We conclude that the beneficial interaction effects were an outcome of the common implementing agency's (DAI's) strategic partnerships and deep engagement with experienced NGOs and their community linkages, but without empowered local government and on-going donor support the empowerment effects on the ground are difficult to sustain.

The discussion below offers evidence for the above assertions. First, we introduce Pakistan's regime type, fragility, and conflict-related characteristics to set the local socio-political context for the two programmes, which motivated their design. Section II presents the recent history of DFID-administered

programmes in Pakistan. The subsequent sections lay out the case for the programmes' comparative analysis (III), methodology (IV), and sub-national comparative contexts (V). Section VI compares the programme design and political analysis, including the theories of changes employed by each. We discuss their overlapping understanding of empowerment and accountability (VII) and then turn to their interaction effects as part of the adaptive programming adopted by both (VIII). This is followed by a brief review of their monitoring and evaluation design (IX). The last two sections outline how both programmes negotiated shrinking civic space (X), and their impacts on the context and actors for empowerment and accountability (XI).

## 2. Background

Pakistan began its most recent democratic transition after a period of military rule under General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). The return to full civilian rule was marked by power-sharing between leading political parties, elected governments completed their full tenures with two successful electoral transitions in 2013 and 2018. In 2010 the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the Constitution devolved more political power and resources to the provinces, fulfilling a longstanding demand for greater provincial autonomy. Pakistan's previous classification as an authoritarian state appeared to be receding as the democratic transition gained momentum (Adeney 2017).

Real progress towards greater democratisation has been mixed at best. Adeney (2017) classifies Pakistan as a hybrid regime, which can be assessed with respect to three dimensions: competitiveness, civil liberties, and the existence of reserved domains. After the 2013 elections it scored well on the measurement of competitiveness. This was partly due to the foiling of an attempt by the intelligence agencies to manoeuvre a hung parliament, progress towards universal suffrage, including increased women's identity card registration, and higher general voter turnout. It scored lower against a measurement of civil liberties, due to its low standing on press freedom, limitations on the freedom of political parties, and ongoing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The third dimension, that of reserved domains, exhibited mixed results. Civilian control of external defence and internal security policy was relatively low and subject to military interference and intelligence agencies' manipulation. The civilian government did retain some control over military appointments, medium control over public policy, and improved political party collaboration in a number of areas (Adeney 2017).

Despite a series of successful national elections, remnants of authoritarian rule persist and may be growing. The elected government of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) in the province of Punjab fostered a culture of patronage politics which led to an increased 'democratic deficit' after 2013 (Javid 2019). The 2018 election process led many observers to accuse the army of rigging it in favour of Imran Khan's party (Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI)) (Hasan 2018). The 2018 elections lacked the legitimacy of the two previous elections, civil liberties remain increasingly circumscribed, and policy formulation is more highly influenced by the military than in the previous two civilian governments.

Thus, the state exhibits all the characteristics of Osaghae's (2007) framework of fragility. It has weak political institutions and bad governance; it lacks legitimacy amongst segments of its citizenry and is unable to exercise effective jurisdiction over large swathes of its territory. It lacks social cohesion and developed

institutions of conflict management and resolution. And finally, it exhibits low levels of economic growth and development and corruption is widespread.

Addressing Pakistan's fragility is critical to the potential success of its development initiatives, which require improved measures of good governance and legitimacy from the state. Table 2.1 presents Pakistan's ranking on selected development indicators, revealing mixed improvement over the past decade. While the annual GDP growth rate has increased to 5.83 per cent (Trading Economics 2020) it is not enough to match the needs of its population of 220 million, expanding at just over 2 per cent per year (World Bank 2020). The Human Development Index (HDI) score has improved slightly, but the country's global ranking has worsened. The new PTI government successfully canvassed on an anti-corruption platform in the 2018 elections, resulting in the prosecution of numerous opposition politicians. Finally, Pakistan's ranking on the Gender Inequality Index is the lowest in South Asia.

**Table 2.1. Pakistan's development ranking by global index**

Global Index	Ranking amongst countries 2019	Score 2019	Ranking amongst countries 2011	Score 2011
Corruption Perceptions Index (2019) <sup>a</sup>	120/180	32/100	134/183	2.5/10
Human Development Index (2020) <sup>b</sup>	152/189	0.560	145/187 <sup>c</sup>	0.504
Gross Domestic Product (2018) <sup>d</sup>		5.83%		2.748%
Gender Inequality Index (2018) <sup>b</sup>	136/162	0.547	115/146 <sup>e</sup>	0.573

Sources: Authors' own based on a. Transparency International (2020) b. UNDP (2020) c. UNDP (2011) d. World Bank (2020) and e. Hausmann *et. al.* (2011)

The period after 9/11 and the global 'War on Terror' generated an indigenous Taliban conflict on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan that engulfed its semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), along with other pockets of the country. The authoritarian regime under General Pervez Musharraf benefitted from Western political support and a wave of improved international development assistance in return for Pakistan's support for the War on Terror. It took a series of military operations, the last of which came under a civilian government in 2015, to quell

the Taliban uprising. Millions were displaced in the process, and over fifty thousand civilians and combatants lost their lives. In 2018, FATA was officially merged into KP province.

Political discontent and rebellion festers across the four main provinces. The nationalist insurgency in Balochistan is ongoing, with much of the province under close military surveillance and normal civilian life there is disrupted. A new social movement in KP, the youth-led Pashtoon Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), is both anti-military and anti-Taliban. In 2018, its public meetings began to attract thousands of supporters although some of its leaders have been charged with sedition and labelled anti-state.

Punjab is the most populous and prosperous province in Pakistan, yet fragility prevails in its southern districts. The jihadi militant groups Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jaish-e-Mohammed, linked to terrorist attacks inside the country and in India, are active in its poorly developed, highly feudal southern belt. Social cohesion in local communities has been undermined by the sectarian and radical discourse of extremist *madrassas*, or seminaries, which continue to operate and enlist poor students. Local service-delivery and advocacy NGOs are subject to restrictions on their activity in the name of security concerns (International Crisis Group 2016).

Civil society helps to strengthen the accountability of the development process in support of the rule of law, service delivery, corruption control and policy monitoring (Hossain et al. 2018). In Pakistan civil society has had a varied relationship of co-optation, confrontation and cooperation with the state (Khan 2001). When General Musharraf brought some leading development technocrats into his government the relationship with some leading civil society organisations temporarily improved. His relationship with civil society then soured after the Lawyer's Movement mobilised national protests against his removal of the Supreme Court Chief Justice, which hastened the end of Musharraf's rule in 2007 (Khan 2019).

The government's relationship with civil society has worsened as an increasingly securitised governance paradigm has come to dominate the state's interaction with NGOs and citizen mobilisations since 2007. Elected governments deploy the security discourse to restrict civic space and selectively delegitimise civil society actors, in particular advocacy and rights-based organisations. Mohmand (2019) describes how spaces closed for groups receiving international funds, and those espousing liberal and democratic human rights agendas after the 2013 elections brought PML (N) into power. Social movements, such as the Okara peasant rebellion, advocates of minority rights and empowerment of marginalised groups, came under extreme pressure with increasing securitisation after 2017 that created a hostile environment for journalists and human rights activists. There have been several instances of abductions and

disappearances, and even peaceful protestors put at risk of being dispersed by force under the pretext of anti-terrorism laws (Mohmand 2019: 13). Under the current regime, a series of new regulations and legal frameworks have limited NGOs' registration process, access to funds and interfere with their governance structures. During 2019 a number of national NGOs have been de-registered by the government, including those partnering with donor agencies on major programmes.

The political momentum for these enhanced measures against NGOs increased as terrorist attacks, sectarian violence, and attacks on religious minorities intensified (Mohmand 2019). After the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil, allegedly with the indirect assistance of a US NGO functionary, a wave of anti-Western sentiment and sense of insecurity provided security agencies with greater impetus to discredit and restrict international NGO activities, thereby affecting both the funding of and programmes for rights-based activities benefitting religious minorities, women and marginalised communities. The sense of insecurity served the interests of the political and religious right in Pakistan which have a long history of challenging the moral legitimacy of rights-based NGOs on the suspicion that they serve Western political agendas (Khan 2018).

Mohmand (2019) argues the implications of closing civic spaces for development outcomes are three-fold. First, the poor and marginalised experience greater difficulty accessing health and education services, as many NGOs are important service-providers in their communities. Second, there are high human and organisational costs to NGOs as they adapt to a 'chilling environment', and, finally, the role of civil society and media to act as watchdogs on macroeconomic management and corruption is minimised. All field research activities in Pakistan now require a 'No Objection Certificate' from a new body comprised of district administration and security agencies, with obvious implications for knowledge production and evidence-based policy outcomes. A number of organisations are no longer permitted to operate and the difficulties in obtaining permission to conduct research reduce the frequency and scope of studies.

Mohmand (2019) posits the political implications of closing civic spaces will be a loss of international standing due to Pakistan's sudden closure of leading international and national NGOs and consequent inability to meet its international development commitments such as the SDGs. It is likely to suffer a credibility deficit as a democratic and accountable government due to the restrictions it places upon civil society space, forcing actors to pay high personal, professional and organisational costs as they struggle to adapt.

## Table 2.2 Pakistan scores on World Democracy Index

Year	Rank	Overall Score	Electoral Process and Pluralism	Functioning of Government	Political Participation	Political Culture	Civil Liberties
2018	112	4.17	6.08	5.36	2.22	2.5	4.71
2013	107	4.64	6	5.36	2.78	3.75	5.29
2008	108	4.46	6.08	5.71	1.11	4.38	5

Source: Authors' own based on Economist Intelligence Unit (2018).

Pakistan's rankings on the World Democracy Index fell during the democratic transition period covering three national elections (Table 2.2). The areas showing the most decline, political culture and civil liberties, have been negatively impacted by the restrictions on civic space and the mainstream media, arrests of political activists, etc. Whilst the score of political culture has decreased, it is based partly on the World Values Survey measure of current public support for authoritarian or military rule, which has increased, while perception of the benefits of democracy has decreased. The civil liberties score, based on expert opinion with respect to the freedom of electronic and print media, public expression and protest, freedom of association, and the rights and freedoms of citizens, amongst others, has also declined (Civicus 2016, 2017, 2018). New laws limit freedom of expression in the media and by the public, and curtail internet freedom.<sup>2</sup> These developments reveal less consolidation and more contestation over maintaining the spaces in civil society and political culture so vital to consolidating democracy.

Religious freedom in Pakistan is restricted through laws and policies that undermine the rights of minorities. Blasphemy is punishable by death, and laws contribute to increasing the vulnerability of Shias, Sufis, members of the Ahmadiyya sect,<sup>3</sup> and Christians to targeting by law enforcement officials and local communities. In some cases, accusations have led to death sentences. In 2012, militants were involved in numerous attacks on minority communities and the desecration of religious sites, fuelling sectarian tensions and generating an environment of fear (United States Department of State 2013).

The highest number of sectarian incidents in recent years occurred at the peak of Taliban militancy in 2007, with 341 incidents. The numbers of those killed continued to rise until 2013, when over 500 died in that year. The violence

<sup>2</sup> These are the Protection of Pakistan Act (2014) and Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (2016).

<sup>3</sup> They were officially declared non-Muslim in a 1974 constitutional amendment, and later forbidden from practicing as Muslims.

tapered off dramatically during the period of the civilian government led by Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) from 2013, which saw only 16 incidents (but 231 killed) in its last full year in power in 2017 (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2020).

Gender inequality is one of the most serious development challenges facing any government in Pakistan (Table 2.1). It impacts Pakistan's global standing and legitimacy as a state capable of delivering to its citizens. Its current gender development index score puts it in the group of countries with the lowest equality achievements in the world (UNDP 2019). Pakistan has the lowest gender parity ranking in South Asia and sits almost at the bottom globally (ranked 151/153).

The state's fragility and the typology of local conflicts have constrained its will and capacity to deliver on gender development commitments. Women's rights are a recurring theme in right-wing political discourse, which seeks to limit women's role in the public sphere and curtail their personal rights in the name of Islam. The policy of Islamisation was used as a justification for the suppression of women's rights under the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq during the 1980s and persists amongst religious political parties in 2020. State-led Islamisation has been accompanied by the spread of religious education organisations, including madrassas and women's groups, which espouse a highly patriarchal view of women's role in society as complementary, but lower, to men. The Pakistani Taliban made use of the same call to Islamise the state and society. It implemented severe restrictions on women's and religious minorities' rights and freedoms in areas under its control during the border conflict (Khan 2018).

Violence against women is an issue that tops the agenda of the women's movement, with leading advocacy NGOs conducting research, supporting policy and legal reforms, and working within communities to stem the practices that perpetuate it. Donor agencies provide support to these efforts, helping to fuel a backlash from conservative forces that accuse women activists of following a 'Western' agenda (Khan 2018). Recent successes include laws established during the past decade to curb rape, honour killings, early marriages, acid crimes, sexual harassment, and domestic violence. The legislation has yet to have an impact upon the lives of ordinary women because the laws lack adequate implementation mechanisms and awareness amongst the public and criminal justice system about their existence. A national survey carried out by the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), National University of Ireland Galway, Ipsos Mori, and the International Centre for Research on Women (2019) found that women with tertiary education are less vulnerable to violence, as are those married before 18 years old, and women from areas where local authorities and police are not trusted. Fragility in governance, accountability and lack of social cohesion appear to be factors perpetuating the high rates of violence against women (SPDC *et al.* 2019)

### 3. The donor environment

Pakistan is historically highly dependent on international aid to support its development sector. International support in return for its support during the post-9/11 War on Terror provided much-needed financing to the military government led by General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007). This international support continued for the civilian regimes during the democratic transition that followed. The major development aid agencies operating currently are the United Nations agencies (led by UNDP), World Bank, Asian Development Bank, USAID, UK Aid (DFID), European Union, JICA and a selection of smaller bilateral donors.

Donor support in KP and the former FATA seeks to address under-development as one of the key drivers of militancy and conflict in the region. The World Bank, USAID and EU are the major donor stakeholders in KP, with programmes which seek to revive the conflict-affected economies of KP and FATA, assist displaced persons, and support women and communities (see Annex 1). Bilateral, mainly Western, donors and the Japanese government also provide support. Table 4.2 provides an overview of DFID's (now FCDO's) programming in Pakistan. It is the largest bilateral donor, running major programmes in health and nutrition, education, rule of law, democratic consolidation and economic development. It recently concluded a major provincial health and nutrition programme, EVA-BHN (£160m) to improve women and child health and increase the capacity of citizens and civil society to demand accountable public services. It will soon conclude a large educational support programme to the government of KP to support mainly girls' education (£283m). Its support in the health sector also extends to additional programmes for nutrition interventions and family planning services.

DFID also provides extensive support to conflict-affected FATA, to assist in the area's recovery, improve governance, and support its recent integration into the province of KP. This support was complemented by a KP programme to strengthen the judicial system and improve citizen's access to the courts and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This funding is directed to UNDP, which works directly with the government. Another DFID programme in both KP and Punjab, administered through an implementing agency, supported sub-national governance by assisting local communities and provincial governments to respond more efficiently to citizen's demands. It overlapped in some districts with the AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme.

The UK government has one major programme with an explicit focus on strengthening democratic processes in Pakistan through supporting institutions and the capacity of parliament and politicians, and improving citizen's engagement in electoral processes. Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan

(CDIP) is administered partially through the UNDP, programmed as a component of the Strengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes (SELP) project. The second main project under CDIP, branded as 'Tabeer', was implemented through the international agency DAI. One of its outputs, to support democratic space, overlapped with AAWAZ 1, primarily a demand-side programme to strengthen citizen's voices and support them to demand greater accountability from government and thereby build a more inclusive democracy in Pakistan.

## 4. The case for comparative analysis of programme interaction effects

Using a comparative case study approach for the multi-country research, we initially planned to study interaction effects between programmes implemented through two different donors within the same country. Since DFID is a major donor in Pakistan running large programmes simultaneously in the provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa we decided to explore if the analytical questions pertaining to synergy and interaction effects between two of its programmes would yield rich insights and increase the depth of our comparative findings. We selected AAWAZ 1 and CDIP for the paired comparison based on a combination of practical and analytical reasons. The practical considerations arose from the need to secure ease of access to programme and downstream partners, without which this research would not have been possible. It is currently impossible to proceed with research in country without government permission.

Table 4.1 provides an overview of AAWAZ and CDIP, based on its programme design and measurable outcomes (DFID 2018a and 2018c). The main analytical reason for selecting these programmes to compare was that they address different elements of the fragility, conflict, and gender inequality features discussed in the section above, and do so through a common vision yet emphasising demand and supply-side elements respectively. The paired comparison explores (a) the synergy between the two programmes, based on their territorial overlap in two provinces, common implementing partners, partially shared programme structure and local human resources; (b) how the programmes complemented each other as demand versus supply-side interventions; (c) whether their synergy differed in its impact across two subnational contexts; and (d) the implications of both programmes' use of common social capital, i.e. local resource persons, for empowerment and accountability interventions in the context of Pakistan's fragility.

**Table 4.1 AAWAZ and CDIP overview**

<b>Programme</b>	<b>AAWAZ Voice &amp; Accountability Programme (2012-2018) £39,099,992</b>	<b>Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan (CDIP) (2016-2020) £26,966,118</b>
<b>Impact</b>	Stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in Pakistan	Consolidating democracy for sustainable stability and development in Pakistan
<b>Outcome</b>	Democratic processes in Pakistan are more open, inclusive and accountable to citizens.	A democratic system in which government institutions are more capable, parliament is more accountable and the state as a whole is more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the Pakistani people.
<b>Outputs</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Women better able to participate safely in politics and in public spaces at federal, provincial and local levels in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Punjab.</li> <li>2. Citizens and communities better able to resolve disputes peacefully and work together for common solutions in KP and Punjab.</li> <li>3. Women and other excluded groups better able to demand improved delivery of services in KP and Punjab.</li> <li>4. Improved evidence generated, synthesised and communicated/ championed to political leaders/ elites in KP and Punjab.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Election management and election oversight processes are more credible, transparent and inclusive.</li> <li>2. Parliamentary processes are more inclusive, and parliamentarians are more effective in holding government to account.</li> <li>3. Political parties across the mainstream political spectrum better represent, respond to and deliver for their constituents.</li> <li>4. Expanded democratic space allows improved policy dialogue, political debate and public discourse.</li> </ol>

Source: Authors' own based on DFID 2018a and 2018c

**Table 4.2 DFID (FCDO) administered programmes in Pakistan**

<b>Programme</b>	<b>Major outcomes</b>	<b>Implementing partners</b>
Punjab Education Support Programme (2013-2020) £387,958,081	To improve access, retention & quality of education in primary and secondary schools (Punjab).	Oxford Policy Management
Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Education Sector Programme (2011-2020) £283,200,858	Improve primary & secondary education by providing technical assistance, financial aid & infrastructure to benefit all primary & lower secondary children. (KP)	UNDP, UNOPS, Govt of KP
EVA-BHN (2013-2019) £160,017,660	Increase coverage & utilisation, particularly by poor, of reproductive, maternal, new-born, and child health (RMNCH) & nutrition services. (KP and Punjab).	Palladium (UK), UNICEF, UNFPA, Population Services International.
KP Merged Districts Support Programme (2018-2024) £108,839,996	Basic health, education, rule of law, civilian peace-building, conflict prevention & resolution (KP and Punjab).	UNDP
Delivering Accelerated Family Planning in Pakistan (2017-2022) £70,999,999	Increase access to quality family planning information and services. (KP and Punjab).	Population Services International
Supporting Nutrition in Pak. (2014-2021) £59,389,939	To improve nutritional status for people in Pakistan, particularly poorest women, girls and under 5 children. (KP and Punjab).	Mott MacDonald Ltd, AECOM, IBRD
Rule of Law in Pakistan Programme (2017-2020) £51,658,166	This programme will support Pakistan to improve citizens' trust and public confidence in rule of law, especially among the poorest and most vulnerable, including minorities, women and girls. This is an ODA and non-ODA integrated programme. (KP and Punjab).	Adam Smith International

AAWAZ Voice & Accountability Programme (2012-2018) £39,099,992	Stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in Pakistan whereby democratic processes are more open, inclusive and accountable to citizens. (KP and Punjab).	DAI
Sub-national Governance (SNG) Programme (2012-2018) £36,428,113	To improve the Pakistan provincial government's capacity to respond more efficiently and effectively to the public service needs of the local communities. (KP and Punjab).	Oxford Policy Management
Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan (CDIP) (2016-2020) £26,966,118	A democratic system in which government institutions are more capable, parliament is more accountable and the state is more responsive (KP and Punjab).	UNDP and DAI
AAWAZ II: Reducing Exploitation, Promoting Inclusion (2018 – 2024) £39,500,000	Pakistani society and government institutions support increased voice, choice and control for marginalised groups, protect from exploitation, prevent discrimination and intolerance at all levels. (KP and Punjab).	British Council, UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women, DAI
Sustainable Energy and Economic Development Programme (2018-2025) £25,597,585	Support provincial economic development & sustainable energy; address Pakistan's energy crisis by providing innovative financial solutions to industry; contribute to DFID's International Climate Fund (ICF) obligations. (KP and Punjab).	IBRD
Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes in Pakistan (STAEP) (2010-2014) £11,707,311	Democratic processes in Pakistan are more open, inclusive, efficient and accountable to citizens. (KP and Punjab).	Asia Foundation
Supporting Electoral Reform in Pakistan (SERP) (2012-2016) £5,679,997	Stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in Pakistan. (KP and Punjab).	IFES
FATA Governance Project (2018-2022) US\$5,420,310 (DFID: \$5,240,000)	Build capacity for effective agency/district level governance, provide technical assistance to policy-making at federal, provincial & agency level. (FATA)	UNDP

Strengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes (2011-2020) US\$7,746,864 (DFID: \$1,740,000)	Technical assistance to ECP, Electoral laws and procedures strengthened, Improved engagement of citizens, particularly women and youth, in electoral processes. (KP and Punjab).	UNDP
FATA Transition & Recovery (2015-2021) US\$25,097,291 (DFID: \$1,585,000)	Support government in contributing to economic, social and political stability in FATA (FATA).	UNDP
Strengthening Rule of Law (2011-2019) US\$9,064,472 (DFID: \$1,410,000)	Strengthened capacity of courts, increased access to justice, improved police services, legal aid & representation mechanism for men, women and other vulnerable groups in KP. (KP)	UNDP

Source: Authors' own based on FCDO 2020

## 4.1 AAWAZ

The first programme under consideration is the first phase of AAWAZ (2012-18), which was a demand-side intervention with a budget of £39.1 million implemented in the provinces of KP and Punjab. Its stated objective was *to help build a more stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy in Pakistan with democratic processes that became open, inclusive and accountable to citizens*. Its empowerment and accountability goals were to improve women's ability to participate safely in politics and in public spaces at federal, provincial and local levels, and improve citizens' and communities' ability to resolve disputes peacefully and make effective demands on government for improved service delivery. It also sought to generate and synthesize improved evidence around citizen actions to attain these goals.

AAWAZ I engaged civil society by using media (television, radio and social media) for awareness raising, establishing Aagahi citizens' centres at the local level to provide training and awareness-raising in communities, and setting up elected forums from the village to the district and provincial levels. Its implementing partner was the international agency DAI with four national NGOs as downstream partners, Sungi, Aurat Foundation, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK) and Strengthening Participatory Organisations (SPO). It provided both men and women with human rights training, especially on domestic violence, and supported citizens to raise their demands (which benefit women and excluded groups) with public officials. It helped women obtain identity cards and register to vote, and trained women to become candidates for local elections.

The programme has been reconfigured for its second phase AAWAZ 2 (2018-22), and renamed 'AAWAZ II: Reducing Exploitation, Promoting Inclusion'. Near its end in 2017, AAWAZ 1 began working on issues of exploitative practices such as child labour, bonded and forced labour, domestic servitude, early and forced marriage. It conducted awareness raising sessions through forums for domestic workers, home based workers, brick kiln workers and factory workers, and held discussions with provincial labour departments. Reducing exploitation and promoting inclusion was labelled an 'emerging priority' in its monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) findings for future DFID programming. The findings also stated that marginalised groups are exceptionally vulnerable to exploitation (DFID 2018a).

This emphasis on reducing exploitation and promoting inclusion is also part of the UK government's broader political agenda to tackle child labour, bonded labour, early and forced marriage, sex trafficking, human trafficking and any forms of exploitative labour. AAWAZ 2 has narrowed down this broader agenda to focus on child labour, child and forced marriage, social cohesion and tolerance and gender-based violence. These thematic areas are part of DFID's logical framework for the programme. UNICEF, UNFPA and UN Women will receive £17.25 million through AAWAZ 2 to work with Pakistani government institutions to strengthen their capacity to tackle these issues and the British Council (£19.9 million) is its new implementing partner for work with communities at the local level. This work is still in the design phase.

## 4.2 Consolidating democracy in Pakistan

The second programme in the paired comparison is Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan (CDIP), which began in 2016 with a £31.5 million budget for three years and has been extended one more year until 2021. CDIP is funded by the UK government's Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), jointly managed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and DFID staff seconded to the fund. It is implemented by UNDP and DAI. It was conceived as a both a demand and supply-side programme, with the objective *to help build a democratic system in which government institutions became more capable, parliament more accountable and state more responsive to needs and aspirations of the people*. Its empowerment and accountability goals are to improve transparency and inclusiveness in election management and oversight, parliamentary processes, and political parties. It seeks to expand the democratic space with improved policy dialogue, political debate and public discourse.

CDIP was designed to ensure that its demand-side work on creating and strengthening citizen's voices was reflected in its supply-side initiatives with government, political institutions and politicians by facilitating dialogues, debates, media engagement and other opportunities for citizen engagement (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020, Karachi, Komal Qidwai). It seeks improved engagement and participation of socially excluded groups, including women, youth, minorities, and disabilities. The programme has engaged civil society organisations, held social media campaigns, seminars, and trainings. Its gender engagement has raised awareness about women's issues, including domestic violence, legal entitlements, and child marriage. It has a strong political participation component, aiming to increase women's voter turnout through training implemented within the AAWAZ's Aagahi centres, increase women's inclusion in political party decision-making and engagement in democratic processes to demand accountability and express voice, and provide training to women in electoral processes. The programme has supported, with some success, a series of legislative reforms to enhance and protect the rights of women and minorities.

CDIP's goal to increase the inclusion of women in democratic processes and enhance their voices for empowerment and accountability overlaps with some of those of AAWAZ I. Its use of the same implementing agency (DAI) and the Aagahi citizen centres established under AAWAZ make it a powerful empirical example of a donor agency's effort to establish synergy within its programmes and ensure efficient use of its resources.

The rapidly evolving social and political context frames the potential and manner in which marginalised communities can develop into active empowered citizens in Pakistan. These research findings will be useful to FCDO as it considers future democracy programming and takes AAWAZ into a second phase, for which the demand-side interventions were still being designed at the time of this research.

## 5. Methodology

We used a mixed-methods approach to this research, drawing on elements of institutional ethnography and subnational comparative approaches to select our field sites and research tools. Institutional ethnography aims to understand social organisation and how it is shaped by underlying power relations, to distinguish what actually occurs on the ground as opposed to what is supposed to happen. We used this understanding to analyse how programme implementation strategies and actions were informed by, and deviated from, programme design. Some practical data collection methods commonly used in line with this approach are interviews, textual analysis, and participant observation (Decruz-Young and Anderson 2019).

The subnational comparative approach was useful for selecting field sites for data collection, as it argues against assuming nation-state homogeneity. It posits that subnational sites are an important unit of analysis when looking at political change. We selected two subnational field sites with varying social and political environments to compare how programmes operated differently in each.

Our literature review examined the business cases, logical frameworks, theories of change, annual project reviews, and programme completion reports. Other documents of interest were research and policy publications, research reports and training materials. Due to the highly sensitive context in which FCDO and other donor organisations operate in Pakistan, only those documents in the public domain may be quoted.

Since AAWAZ's first phase was completed at the time of our fieldwork, it was not possible to observe ongoing activities. Most of CDIP's programme activities were complete after the 2018 elections, however, the women's voter registration campaign work using resources from AAWAZ remained ongoing. Fieldwork took place in three locations:

1. Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, where the head offices of FCDO, DAI and the British Council, and national NGO partners are located;
2. Multan city and one rural site in Multan district, Punjab province;
3. D.I. Khan city and one rural site in D.I. Khan district, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

Our field research tools were primarily key informant interviews and focus group discussions. We supplemented them with informal interviews and interactions, and participant observation during a CDIP programme review meeting with managers from all districts. In each district field site we interviewed district programme staff, members of citizens groups established under AAWAZ 1, and appointed government officials – district election commissioners and officials of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) – who interacted with both programmes. In Islamabad we interviewed senior DFID staff responsible for the programmes, previous team leaders from DAI responsible

for CDIP and AAWAZ, and the new team leader for AAWAZ 2 affiliated with the new implementing partner the British Council. AAWAZ 1 was implemented in partnership with four national NGOs, we conducted interviews with senior staff from two of these.

CDIP and AAWAZ were structured differently, but both were implemented through DAI in Islamabad. Some AAWAZ programme staff and resource people were used by the CDIP voter registration campaign at the district and local level, thus interviews with these individuals are classified under both programmes in Annex 2. Government officials interviewed from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and NADRA also worked with both programmes at the district levels.

## 6. Sub-national comparison

We selected two districts, Multan and Dera Ismail (D.I.) Khan (Table 6.1) from two different provinces to allow for sub-national comparison of the programme interaction effects. There were several differences in the socio-cultural and political context of the two districts. Interfaith conflict is more pervasive in Multan than in D.I. Khan, whereas the latter district has seen greater conflict related to the rise of militancy and a more highly patriarchal cultural context (interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019, Islamabad, Ayesha Khan).

**Table 6.1 Characteristics of districts paired for comparison**

Province	Punjab	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
District	Multan	D.I. Khan
Population	4.75 million <sup>4</sup>	1.63 million <sup>5</sup>
Language	Seraiki	Seraiki (& Pashto)
HDI Rank	0.718 <sup>6</sup>	0.496
Features of Conflict	Local extremist/militant groups, inter-faith & sectarian	Taliban-led militancy & terrorist attacks, sectarian
Local Government	Last elections 2015, currently inactive	Last elections 2015, currently inactive

Source: Authors' own

Multan district is in southern Punjab, the economically weaker belt of Pakistan's most prosperous and populated province bordering the province of Sindh. Its population of mainly Seraiki-speakers, have an expressed interest in forming their own province. Southern Punjab is characterised by low income levels, weak asset bases, poor infrastructure, and weak service delivery, such as health and education (Mehboob 2011).

The area has not come under direct control of militant groups nor seen direct army action, yet a number of extremist religious organisations are based here. The growth of religious seminaries, *madrassas*, attracting impoverished students became a cause for growing concern after it emerged the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks were carried out by the banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba using local youth. Since then, security and intelligence agencies have had a strong presence in the district and civil society organisations experience high levels of surveillance in the name of national security and counter terrorism. It is more difficult for donor programmes to operate in South Punjab than in KP, because many activities require

4 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017).

5 Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017).

6 UNDP (2017).

No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from the government (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019, Islamabad, Komal Qidwai).

Interfaith conflict exists due to discrimination against members of minority religious groups present in southern Punjab, such as Christians, Shias, Hindus, and the Ahmadiyya sect (who identify as Muslim yet are disallowed to identify as such by the state). AAWAZ's research revealed prejudicial attitudes against religious minorities amongst lawyers in Multan (Janjua 2015), and some social pressure on Christians to convert to Islam (Aftab and Taj 2015). Cases of sectarian conflict between Shias and Sunnis have also been reported (interview AAWAZ Forum Members, 13 January 2020, Multan, Komal Qidwai and S. Javed).

D.I. Khan district, part of southern KP province, borders the former tribal area of Waziristan on one side and Punjab province on the other. Its large Seraiki-speaking population differentiates it from KP's mainly Pashto-speaking heartland. This semi-urban district has been severely affected by recent years of Taliban-led militancy, but was nonetheless a well-performing district under AAWAZ, with many local women involved in forums and Aagahi centres working enthusiastically despite great personal risk (interview H. Khalique, 5 December 2019, Karachi, Ayesha Khan). AAWAZ reported exceptional progress in D.I. Khan, particularly for Output 3, which was focused on improved service delivery (DFID 2014b; DFID 2013b). Frequent bomb blasts and targeted killings, however, have had a negative effect on businesses and increased unemployment (Insan Foundation Trust 2013: 29). Conflict and stricter patriarchal norms make it difficult for donor programmes to operate there (interview S. Khan, 17 January 2020, D.I. Khan, Komal Qidwai).

D.I. Khan is the only district in the province with high rates of sectarian conflict (interview M. Shahbaz, 6 February 2020, Karachi (telephone), Komal Qidwai). Possibly due to its proximity with FATA regions, D.I. Khan has been more vulnerable to militant attacks on Shias as it serves as a passageway for militants to move from the former tribally-governed regions to other parts of the country. Local Shias blame 'Talibanisation' in the district on Saudi Wahhabism exported to Pakistan. This, together with Iran's interventions to negate Saudi influence, has increased sectarian tensions in the district, leading to the displacement of numerous Shias who have sold their businesses and land to Afghan settlers and migrants from the tribal areas (Janjua and Noel 2015).

AAWAZ engaged with elected representatives at different levels in D.I. Khan to push for improved service delivery and the demands of citizens to be heard. The programme worked with local governments when they were active, but did not rely on this engagement (interview S. Khan, 17 January 2020). CDIP staff reported that when local government was active their programme was still in its nascent stage and focused on the 2018 General Elections. Post-elections, they would have engaged with local government because their strategy then shifted to broader awareness-raising, voter education and connecting citizens to representatives through an online voter portal (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020), but, as in Punjab, local government is currently inactive in KP.

## 7. Programme design and political analysis

This section examines the analysis and approaches between CDIP and AAWAZ in design, implementation, and monitoring of empowerment and accountability outcomes in the Pakistan context. We ask to what extent DFID used conflict and vulnerability analysis and/or social and political analysis in the FCVAS context to inform programme design and implementation approaches, and identify and address drivers of accountability and which social and political actors to engage with. We found both AAWAZ and CDIP were born out of a political economy analysis (PEA) of Pakistan's context. AAWAZ was an ambitious programme designed 'to strengthen the social compact between citizen and state' (DFID 2011: 5) by acting as a 'backbone of support' to DFID Pakistan, through building the demand side for its education, health, and border area programmes, and synergising with its electoral programmes (DFID 2011). CDIP was designed to consolidate both the UK government's support for strengthening democratic processes, and engaging with both demand and supply-side actors.

AAWAZ and CDIP's desired impact and outcomes overlap. AAWAZ used PEA at a macro and micro-level during its inception phase, based on which it recommended that civil society organisations be supported to strengthen their linkages with relevant stakeholders; advocacy and outreach programming be developed to influence policies; and new leadership be encouraged to support AAWAZ goals (DFID 2013a). CDIP took the approach one step further by piloting a live PEA as a case study of 'thinking and working politically' and to create adaptive and flexible programme interventions, which proved effective to helping the programme team manage the political dynamics on the ground (DFID 2018c).

AAWAZ's rationale was grounded in DFID's previous programming of electoral support and complemented other donors' on-going work in the area of gender empowerment. The business case for AAWAZ argued UK support was needed to help Pakistan become 'a stable, inclusive and tolerant democracy' (DFID 2011: 5). The programme intended to remedy the social exclusion of Pakistanis from politics and governance, which DFID viewed as a threat to Pakistan's stability. This social exclusion gulf is exacerbated by a lack of citizens' trust in the government due to 'its inability to protect them from violence and militancy, and to deliver basic services' (DFID 2011: 5). The business case argued that social, ethnic and religious divisions fuel intolerance, making minorities and women more vulnerable and contributing to greater violence and lawlessness. Thus, AAWAZ intended to 'build the social compact between citizen and state and lead to a fairer allocation of resources' (DFID 2011: 5), although such an ambitious agenda of reform was not articulated in later programme documents.

AAWAZ specifically targeted districts of KP and Punjab 'prone to local level disputes and disagreements', to enable the safe participation of excluded groups in local, provincial and federal governance structures, enhance peaceful dispute resolution and enable communities to work together to address their service delivery and other local issues. It aimed to complement and build on work done by major development and advocacy NGOs in implementing donor-funded community empowerment and gender programmes, as well as DFID's own supply-side programming, specifically the Subnational Governance programme (SNG 1), and health and education programmes.

The AAWAZ design proposed synergising with DFID's existing electoral programming, including the Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes in Pakistan (STAEP) programme, which ran from 2011-2014 as a demand-side support to citizens' electoral participation, with one focus being increased female participation in the 2013 elections. STAEP itself complemented demand-side support to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) under DFID's Support to Electoral Reforms in Pakistan (SERP) programme (DFID 2014a). An evaluation of STAEP and SERP noted that social exclusion needed to be more explicitly incorporated in the design of future election support programmes (Gazdar and Balagamwala 2014). The AAWAZ design anticipated and partially met this overall recommendation before the STAEP and SERP evaluations were complete.

AAWAZ's revised problem analysis, which served as a preamble to modifications in its theory of change argued that in Pakistan 'elite capture and control of resources has led to weak governance processes in all spheres' (DAI 2015: 3) preventing the state from meeting the development and security needs of its citizens, in turn has deepening social and political divisions. The analysis held that empowering women and excluded groups was critical to strengthening democracy and holding the state accountable, requiring interventions beyond those focusing exclusively on supply-side governance (DAI 2015: 3).

This demand-side, citizen's empowerment approach, empowering women and socially vulnerable groups to become equal citizens of the state, reflected UK government priorities in FCVAS contexts. The DFID policy for building peaceful states and societies outlines an integrated framework to: (1) address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms; (2) support inclusive political settlements and processes; (3) develop core state functions; and (4) respond to public expectations (DFID 2010: 6). AAWAZ remained within this framework but focused on addressing root causes of conflict and inequalities and creating an inclusive political environment. Its strategy was to set up parallel citizens' forums to improve women's political participation and conflict resolution within communities, reduce gender-based violence, and enable citizens to demand better service delivery (DFID 2013a). The programme used power analysis within the forums to identify types and triggers of conflicts in communities and explore ways to pre-empt these conflicts (DFID 2016).

CDIP's business case envisioned an opportunity to deepen democratic culture and practice before the 2018 election cycle to further the UK's strategic objective of seeing stability in Pakistan. It is funded by the UK government's Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). CDIP is intended to complement other programmes administered through this fund, including the Rule of Law, FATA stabilisation and integration projects. Its view of the political context draws attention to certain weaknesses in the democratic transition. It was designed to take a holistic strengthening approach to democratisation in Pakistan, focusing on improving the quality of political governance institutions, increasing their accountability along with citizen inclusion through bridging the gaps that separate the supply and demand side of previous programming and engaging civil society groups more directly with government and politicians to support democratic processes and legislation (Jilani 2020).

CDIP came on board towards the end of AAWAZ's first phase. The interaction effects between the two programmes' demand-side work was a deliberate part of the 'transition phase' between AAWAZ's first and second phases, and integral to the success of CDIP given its own implementation time-frame (DFID 2016). However, some programme implementers on the ground refer to CDIP as primarily a supply-side programme whose main focus became supporting the government and political institutions for the successful roll-out of credible and legitimate national elections in 2018.

## 7.1 Theories of Change

Both programmes envisioned similar outcomes and impact with respect to strengthening democracy by making it more inclusive (AAWAZ) and more accountable to citizens (CDIP). It was Output 4 of CDIP, the expansion of democratic spaces, which overlapped most directly with AAWAZ's Output 1, women better able to participate in politics and public spaces. In effect, Output 4 of CDIP was the most demand-side output of the programme that worked with civil society to strengthen citizen-state interactions and improve the capacity of CSOs to engage with state institutions. It was intended to augment the goals of Outputs 1-3, which also supported civil society in its dealings with the ECP, parliamentarians and political parties, and further underscore the citizen interaction element in CDIP (Jilani 2020).

The AAWAZ Theory of Change (ToC) underwent one major modification during the programme's duration. After its 2014 review, Output 2 shifted from conflict mediation, i.e. an improvement in citizens' and communities' ability to resolve disputes peacefully (Figure 7.1 below), to a conflict pre-emption approach, with concurrent changes in the monitoring and evaluation framework and logframe. The programme had initially created peace committees in communities for conflict resolution, but soon found that socially excluded or marginalised people (including women) came under pressure to use informal dispute resolution mechanisms to settle disputes, which would reinforce patriarchal norms unless

arbitrators were sufficiently sensitised. The review found the programme could not provide sufficient training on conflict resolution and recommended a shift towards conflict prevention (DFID 2015). AAWAZ therefore turned its focus to two sources of conflict: inter-faith and sectarian conflicts, and domestic violence (DAI 2015).

This change to conflict pre-emption was recorded successfully in AAWAZ's programme documentation, and indicators to measure the impact of this output were changed accordingly (DFID 2018a) (see Table 7.1 below). Programme leads communicated the change effectively to programme staff at national, district and Aagahi centre (local) levels, as reflected through our field interviews at different levels.


**Table 7.1 Changes in AAWAZ output 2 indicators**

Indicators	2013-2014 <sup>a</sup>	2015 <sup>b</sup>	2016 onwards <sup>c</sup>
1.	Cumulative number of community level disputes identified, pre-empted and peacefully resolved by the communities themselves or through government notified ADR mechanisms.	Number of women and men informed about support mechanisms and provided with awareness on non-violent communication and valuing diversity.	Number of women and men informed about support mechanisms and provided with awareness on non-violent communication and valuing diversity.
2.	Cumulative number of excluded group households participating in AAWAZ Forums and local level peace building initiatives.	Number of women, men and socially excluded citizens positively impacted by AAWAZ forum interventions/members' actions to protect them from discrimination, harmful cultural practices & violence (sectarian, gender, religious, etc.	a) Number of women, men and socially excluded citizens positively impacted by AAWAZ forum interventions/ members' actions to protect them from discrimination, harmful cultural practices & violence (sectarian, inter-faith, gender based, etc.) b) Qualitative percentage of people in programme districts who consider community pre-emption and cohesion mechanisms to be credible and effective.
3.	Percentage of people in programme districts who consider AAWAZ community cohesion mechanisms to be credible and effective.	Number of women and excluded group members participating in AAWAZ Forums' local level peace building initiatives (data disaggregated by gender and religion).	Number of women and excluded group members participating in AAWAZ Forums' local level peace building initiatives (data disaggregated by gender and religion).


Sources: Authors' own based on a. (DFID 2013b, 2014b) b. (DFID 2015) c. (DFID 2016, 2017b)

Figure 7.1 AAWAZ theory of change

Source: DFID 2018



**Figure 7.2 CDIP theory of change**



Both the AAWAZ and CDIP programme theories of change (ToC) identify problems in political culture which need to be addressed. The CDIP ToC identifies problem areas mainly in terms of the capacity of formal political institutions, such as the ECP, parliament and political parties. Public and civil society are brought into the ToC in relation to lack of public trust in government institutions and lack of inclusion, with gender as one cross-cutting theme. The AAWAZ ToC identifies an authoritarian and exclusionary political culture that blocks citizens' 'participation and voice in policies, laws and decisions' as a problem area, although this is embedded in a deeper analysis of individual, social and political inequalities the programme has sought to address.

## 7.2 The role of consortium partners

DAI implemented AAWAZ 1 by working with consortium partners that have been among the leading advocacy and development NGOs operating in Pakistan since the 1980s. All had an extensive track record of organising communities to advocate with government for increased citizen empowerment and for state accountability. The values and experience of these partners enabled AAWAZ's community outreach and informed the adaptive programme design. These partners are introduced briefly below.

Aurat Foundation (AF) was established in 1986 by Pakistan women's movement leaders to work on women's political and economic empowerment, ending violence against women, ensuring compliance with international commitments, increasing women's access to justice and legal rights, and social mobilisation of communities for rights-based activism and advocacy. It has played a leading role in increasing women's political participation and achieving recent breakthroughs in progressive law-making. Its networks of citizen groups in 128 districts across the country have been in place since the 1990s (Aurat Foundation 2020). Drawing on its extensive work on women's political participation, AF led Output 1 under AAWAZ.

South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK) was formed in 1987 by a group of intellectuals and social activists to empower marginalised groups to demand and advocate for their rights. It has built the capacity of over 500 local CSOs and CBOs in a range of development activities, many of which organisations are still operational in the field. It also carries out programmes on voter education and has conducted candidates' facilitation and election monitoring. In recent years, it has increased its engagement with peasants, workers, women, religious minorities and political workers (SAP-PK 2020). SAP-PK led Output 2, the conflict resolution work under AAWAZ.

Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO) and Sungi Development Foundation were the technical leads on social mobilisation, Output 3 of the programme. SPO began in 1985 as the Small Projects Technical Support Office

funded by Canadian Aid for their Social Sector Funds Project and grew into an autonomous organisation, directly carrying out capacity building of community-based organisations (CBOs) and expanding its offices across the country. It also developed specialised programmes for female literacy and village level education in Balochistan and KP (Naqeeb 2006).

Sungi began its work in 1989 to mobilise citizens to advocate for effective development policies related to health, education and the environment. Sungi worked on relief and rehabilitation efforts for the 1992 floods in the KP region, which increased its contact with communities and coordination with local activists. Its core strategy is to work through village organisations to mobilise and empower communities for rights based advocacy and to work on sustainable livelihoods, disaster management, and social development. Sungi focused on three aspects of social mobilisation under the programme, which were capacity enhancement, building human resources, and connecting citizens as rights' holders to the state. Sungi includes women in all its interventions, and has run a political education programme for women (Sungi Development Foundation 2020).

All four consortium partners were responsible for implementing the three main outputs of the programme in the field (DFID 2018a). Each organisation led one output through producing its training material and recommending implementation strategies. All training material was produced after consultation between the partners, and standardised across all districts. AF, SAP-PK, and SPO each operated in 13 districts across KP and Punjab, and Sungi operated in 6 districts in KP (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019). Many AAWAZ District Managers who were previously affiliated with the four consortium partners later became CDIP Cluster Coordinators and affiliated with DAI (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019, Murree, facilitated by Komal Qidwai).

## 8. Empowerment and accountability

We now turn to the question of how the donor's analysis and practice relate empowerment with accountability, implicitly or explicitly. We found that the two DFID programmes were consistent in their understanding and articulation of these concepts. This synergy was enhanced through a shared emphasis on gender empowerment to achieve programme goals, and a shared use of DAI as an implementing partner which in turn partnered with downstream NGOs with a history of working towards the same vision of a participatory citizen-state compact. The programmes also used the same CAR framework to measure voice and accountability.

AAWAZ and CDIP's understanding of gender empowerment were broadly aligned. Harris Khalique (interview H. Khalique, 5 December 2019), who served as DAI's AAWAZ Team Leader, understood it as essentially a gender programme, on the assumption that women in Pakistan experience a fragile and hostile environment everywhere. Other staff say its vision of change was to assist communities to consolidate their demands and push them to take action, and it did so through providing training to women on democracy through mock political processes, elected women's assemblies, and providing them exposure to parliamentarians (interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020, Karachi, Ayesha Khan; interview M. Shahbaz, 6 February 2020). The conflict-related work became directed towards raising awareness about violence against women and preventing domestic violence, which further reinforced the gender identity of the programme. CDIP's view of gender empowerment was framed by its focus on expanded democratic space, and within that women's participation. Its Output 4 sought to mobilise individuals through greater engagement, such as policy dialogues, debates and political inclusion (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020). In further consonance with AAWAZ's understanding of empowerment, social inclusion was a key component of the CDIP campaign (interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019). It used women celebrities for its media campaign to encourage women to vote and formed pre-election coalitions of CSOs to hold seminars and events to mobilise women for political participation (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020).

AAWAZ and CDIP both used DFID's framework for measuring voice and accountability, known as CAR, which focuses on three overlapping elements of governance. These are: (1) Capability, which refers to the ability of leaders and government to perform effectively and provide stability and growth. (2) Accountability, which refers to the ability of citizens, civil society and the private sector to hold public sector and government accountable and ensure transparency with a free media and open electoral process. (3) Responsiveness

of state institutions and policies to the rights of citizens, including their access to public services and policies to reduce inequalities (Holland et al. 2009).

All the AAWAZ goals (see Figure 7.1) are related to the empowerment of women and the improved accountability of political leaders and government to women, and other excluded groups, to service delivery and local demands. According to the AAWAZ Deputy Team Leader, the adaptive programming approach allowed them to incorporate new language into the programme as it evolved, such as 'deepening the change' and enhancing its concept of empowerment to include developing women 'change-makers'. The DAI programme structure incorporated feedback from the field level and adapted programme strategies accordingly.

CDIP and AAWAZ targeted similarly marginalised groups. AAWAZ officially sought to build the capacity of women, youth and excluded groups, i.e. constitutionally-defined religious minorities, third-gender persons, people with disabilities, landless and ethno-linguistic minorities (DFID 2017a). CDIP targeted women, people with disabilities, transgender people and nomads specifically (DFID 2018c) through increasing their political participation as voters and decision-makers in political parties, while AAWAZ actually built an apparatus of participation and representation.

This apparatus was a network of forums (village councils, district women's assemblies and provincial forums), youth circles of influence, open courts ('*khuli katcheries*'), and Aagahi centres. The Aagahi centres, conceptualised as women-friendly spaces and staffed by a local woman resource person (RP) in each district, provided training on human rights, domestic violence awareness, conflict pre-emption and peace building. Women reported the centres as being a cathartic space for them.

Citizens from the village councils elected women to the district assemblies, who in turn elected their representatives to the AAWAZ Provincial Forum. The open courts brought citizens, politicians and government officials together to hear local complaints, many of which were resolved through this mechanism. All AAWAZ forums had at least 50 per cent female participation.


Each level of this apparatus was in effect a means to off-set patronage politics and elite capture at the district level by including representation in AAWAZ forums from previously excluded groups and ensuring that citizen's demands were heard. By creating new spaces for engagement and facilitating citizen's encounters with government officials (ombudsmen, courts, anti-corruption departments, etc.) and media representatives, the programme bypassed significant barriers to empowerment and accountability at the local level (AAWAZ District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020, D.I. Khan, facilitated by S. Javed). Some AAWAZ activity participants were financially rewarded for their time, which had potential implications for the 'endogenous'

nature of their social and political action (Esser 2019), although the programme did break state monopoly of ‘official executive oversight’ at multiple governance levels (DFID 2018a: 23).

AAWAZ forum members’ interactions with elected and non-elected government officials took place through the *khuli katcheris*, or open forums in which government officials were invited to respond to citizen’s demands in person. The AAWAZ District Coordination Committees – which included programme managers from implementing partners and were headed by the Deputy Commissioner of each district – were helpful in organising these open forums and maintaining links with district government officials.

Social inclusion was a key component of AAWAZ (interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019). The programme began by training participants within its forums. These trained participants then made village health plans and village education plans to improve service delivery. The plans were shared with government health and education departments to influence the government’s own development plans for villages and districts (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019).

**Figure 8.1 AAWAZ organogram**



Source: Authors own based on information from AAWAZ

AAWAZ’s NGO partners’ understanding of empowerment and accountability and citizen mobilisation was aligned with that of CDIP’s Tabeer programme and DFID. They saw the programme as connecting citizens to networks and forums to enable social and political action to resolve their issues. Still, district level AAWAZ staff found local citizen understandings of empowerment and accountability, and social and political action are shaped by their cultural, social and political context and do differ from mobilisers’ conceptions. When the AAWAZ team went into communities, they found varied levels of awareness and

disempowerment. As a result, they identified different target communities within local settings, using mapping to identify needs, priorities and areas of conflict (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). DFID used Aurat Foundation's knowledge to identify community needs and design the gender training material for Aagahi centres (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019).

AAWAZ modelled parallel democratic processes. People from target communities selected representatives for the AAWAZ Village Forum, a mixed group of men, women, and other marginalised people, which in turn elected representatives for the union council (UC) and district level forums. These various forums held meetings to identify community problems and propose solutions (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). These AAWAZ forums mobilised villagers towards collective action to hold their local government councillors and government officials accountable. Problems that could not be solved at the village and UC levels were brought to district forum members who would connect people to the relevant government departments, local government representatives, or local politicians (AAWAZ District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020). Underpinning this work was the belief that when government officials see citizens actively participating, they cannot refuse to engage with them (interview S. U. Khan, 17 January 2020, D.I. Khan, Komal Qidwai and S. Javed).


The programme soon initiated a District Women's Assembly to compensate for male dominance in these forums. The assemblies trained women in political and legislative processes, replicating the work of a legislative assembly. Some of the women elected to the District Women's Assembly went on to contest local elections (AAWAZ District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020).

The local female resource person at each Aagahi Centre became a key community mobiliser and contact for facilitating local demands. Before joining AAWAZ, these RPs often lacked skills and confidence, but through the programme learned to engage with communities and government (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). In Multan, where NGOs are distrusted, RPs helped to build trust and sensitise locals to gender issues (interview S. U. Khan, 17 January 2020). In D.I. Khan, RPs assisted women to cast their votes for the first time, and mobilised women through their own networks to engage in programme activities (AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020, D.I. Khan, facilitated by Komal Qidwai). RPs assisted locals in meeting up across religious, gender and class divides, often for the first time, sensitising and training them on political and social issues (AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus

Group Discussion, 13 January 2020, Multan, facilitated by Ayesha Khan; AAWAZ District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020).

All the cluster coordinators from the Tabeer programme’s voter registration campaign were previously affiliated with the four NGO consortium partners in AAWAZ I. Many Aagahi Centre RPs later joined the Tabeer campaign as social mobilisers. Supervised by district managers, they would go into communities and visit women in their homes to encourage and often convince them to have Computerised National Identity Cards (CNICs), a prerequisite for voting. These social mobilisers even made announcements in local mosques to inform people about the campaign. Once they had lists of identified individuals for CNIC registration, they would ask NADRA for Mobile Registration Vans (MRVs) to undertake the registrations in the community, or to make arrangements to transport people to NADRA’s National Resource Centres (NRCs). NADRA provides the MRV service for those villages that do not have an NRC within a 10 kilometre vicinity. The vans are staffed and equipped to process CNIC requests, with computers for data entry and fingerprint scanners. MRVs often have only male staff members, to which many men in conservative target communities objected. Social mobilisers, both men and women, therefore engaged with community and village elders and male family members of the women to sensitise them and ensure their cooperation. The social mobilisers continued to follow up with NADRA on the CNICs of identified individuals, and assisted people, particularly transgender and disabled individuals, in meeting NADRA’s documentation requirements.

**Figure 8.2 CDIP organogram**



Source: Authors’ own based on information from CDIP

Initially CDIP found it difficult to mobilise members of the public for its voter registration campaign, so it did not make avoiding elite capture a priority. If local influentials actively participated they were encouraged to continue, so the programme could establish ‘buy in’ within the community. Subsequently the programme slowly included marginalised groups, and trained them in avoiding

hijacking of the political space by influential elites. Programme officers say they made an effort not to favour participants based on their own personal connections, families and castes (Interview S. Khan, 17 January 2020).

Tabeer's district coordinators' understanding of women's empowerment suggests it was influenced by AAWAZ, possibly through design or the previous experiences many of the coordinators had of working with the programme. The coordinators note that the programme seeks to empower women to analyse and resolve issues themselves. Tabeer sought to create awareness in women and mobilise them to take action through helping them to get identity cards and register to vote (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019).

There were significant external constraints to the empowerment and accountability goals of both AAWAZ and CDIP. AAWAZ programme respondents in Multan and D.I. Khan districts regretted that the broader context did not develop further to support the programme's work. For the first three years of AAWAZ, local government, consisting of the three tiers of union council, district, and tehsil elected bodies, in both KP and Punjab were inactive due to delays in elections, meaning the programme forums served as alternative spaces for citizens to voice their demands and interact with local politicians and non-elected government officials. While national elections took place in 2018, local government elections were delayed (I. A. Khan 2019; Warraich 2019). Respondents noted that the high rate of turnover of government officials was disruptive to the relationship and trust-building work of the programme (AAWAZ District Forum Members Focus Group Discussion, 16 January 2020; interview S. U. Khan, 17 January 2020).

Fieldwork revealed the interface between CDIP and AAWAZ may have helped to undercut some of these constraints and enable the empowerment and accountability agenda of AAWAZ to continue even after the end of its first phase. The boxes highlighted in green in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 above indicate where the programmes overlapped through using common human resources. The blue boxes indicate which programme structures CDIP used formally for its women voter registration campaigns.

CDIP's Tabeer programme came on board after AAWAZ was underway but the interface between the two programmes through Tabeer's use of the AAWAZ structure for its demand-side work was facilitated through having a common implementing agency. Interview respondents believe that the idea for using Aagahi centres for Tabeer's voter registration emerged as part of the adaptive programming and value for money approach which the programme had from the start, enabling it to take this strategic decision. Using AAWAZ partner grantee organisations and partner grantee organisations funded through an Innovation and Research Fund (IRF) which it set up, provided Tabeer with an advantage

over other voter registration efforts in the run-up to the 2018 elections (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020).

Interviews suggest that DAI intended to use Aagahi centres to implement Tabeer, and any initial reluctance from programme staff was overcome through DFID which was interested in using the infrastructure built up through AAWAZ (interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020). Although CDIP as a programme did not follow the consortium model, it did leverage the strength of this model through its interaction with AAWAZ.

## 9. Interaction effects as adaptive programming

This section addresses the question of how different donor programmes interact with one another with respect to their roles in enabling empowerment and accountability to explore areas of synergy, or possible conflict, in this dynamic. We find the interaction effects between AAWAZ and CDIP are a powerful example of adaptive programming in a fragile social and political context. The common implementing partner DAI worked closely with DFID and CSSF colleagues to adapt programming strategies on the ground, and strong communication channels with community and NGO partnerships informed this process. When DAI started to implement Tabeer, after AAWAZ was well underway, it was ideally positioned to build on these existing partnerships to meet its goals.

The DAI leadership worked closely with DFID colleagues,<sup>7</sup> engaging in weekly or fortnightly meetings. This enabled adaptive programming and creative strategising during the roll-out of AAWAZ. As a result of the political economy analysis and engagement between the key actors, the biggest evolution in AAWAZ programme design and implementation was the change from conflict resolution to conflict pre-emption. This was the result of field findings regarding the utility of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as *jirgas* or public safety commissions. Team leaders concluded that ADR was not working and there were inherent risks in setting up tiers similar to *jirgas* for mediating or resolving local conflicts (interview H. Khaliq, 5 December 2019). The team leader realised if transformational change was envisioned then they needed to have conversations within communities about conflict pre-emption and be prepared to modify the programme (interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020).

Another programme adaptation was required in order to facilitate women's inclusion more effectively. In the programme's social mobilisation phase in KP, it was very difficult to form groups and forums including both men and women, and impossible to mobilise women resource people for the Aagahi centres. These were at first run exclusively by men, until DAI created additional resource centres specifically for women so that the male-run centres could be phased out (interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019).

One design modification was to reduce the number of citizen's committees in each district, due to constraints on management and accountability. Thus, union council forums replaced village forums, and represented ten villages each because it proved unwieldy for the programme to manage hundreds of village

---

7 These included both DFID and FCO staff seconded to CSSF for CDIP.


forums (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019). Team leaders also removed tehsil forums, corresponding to the second tier of local government above union councils, and worked on a district level, or third tier, in order to maintain programme focus (interview K. Fayyaz, 14 January 2020, Multan, Ayesha Khan).

DFID and DAI told district staff to adapt to ground realities and that they would support them in doing so (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). Every AAWAZ Forum offered feedback to the implementing consortium partner, who would then set goals for activities and targets accordingly, e.g. by focusing on a specific topic for training (interview AAWAZ Forum Members, 13 January 2020). There was flexibility in the implementation strategy because the cultural and political environment varied between districts (interview S. U. Khan, 17 January 2020). In more conservative KP the AAWAZ Forums for men and women were initially separate, but in Punjab they were mixed. Where it was challenging in KP to mobilise women, female resource people worked with male co-facilitators, who were their husbands or brothers (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019).

CDIP also worked as an adaptive political programme, responsive to new opportunities and the current political environment. Programme officers provided feedback to their managers who revised the strategy as needed (interview S. Khan, 17 January 2020). During the first two pre-election years of the programme all activities focused on political inclusion, awareness, electoral participation, and mobilising voters, especially women and socially excluded groups. This mobilisation involved making people aware of the importance of electoral participation. They worked from district to provincial levels, focusing on demand creation. CDIP prepared an action plan to raise awareness about local government elections, which in the end was not used as the elections did not happen (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020).

CDIP's Tabeer programme initially engaged directly with civil society organisations through setting up an Innovation and Research Fund (IRF) to provide them and citizen groups with small grants focusing on Sustainable Development Goal 16 to promote peace, justice and strong institutions. After EU and Canada's support to ECP didn't materialise due to the lack of an administrative arrangement and coordination between EU and the Government of Pakistan (GoPK), Tabeer, with agreement from DFID, decided to repurpose its IRF resources to supplement ECP's polling staff training to maximise coverage across the provinces. The government imposed further regulations on CSOs in late 2017, prior to the elections, with implications for Tabeer's selection of partner organisations in favour of those with a history of successfully negotiating regulations at various levels of government (DAI 2019: 4).

**Figure 9.1 Theory of action in AAWAZ and CDIP**



Source: Authors' own based on information from AAWAZ and CDIP

The timing of the interaction between the two programmes took place when AAWAZ was winding down but still active, and CDIP was beginning its voter registration work. The interaction built on the advantage of AAWAZ’s citizen outreach and mobilisation network, using resource people as social mobilisers and cluster coordinators for CDIP. Thus, DAi as common implementing agency used the human resources generated through the AAWAZ programme for Taber.

Taber registered women voters through Aagahi centres, all 450 of which it funded for a year after the AAWAZ funding came to an end, and used former AAWAZ resource people and staff for its campaign. Using the centres, Taber reached out to over 100,000 citizens for civic voter education. Before AAWAZ fully ended, its forums and Aagahi centres were already being used to help women get national identity cards (CNICs) and educate them about the voting process (DFID 2018b). Taber later engaged resource people from these Aagahi centres to work on its subsequent women voter registration and voter education campaigns (DFID 2018c). This enhanced both the outcome of these campaigns and their value for money since DAi did not need to set up a mid-tier administration, using the resource people already in place. The cluster

coordinators hired for the campaign also drew from amongst field staff from the four main NGO consortium partners in AAWAZ (interview U. Khanzada, 6 December 2019, Islamabad, Ayesha Khan; interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019).

The ECP's District Voter Education Committees (DVEC) also facilitated capitalising on AAWAZ staff knowledge, as they included many of the same government representatives (ECP and NADRA) and civil society representatives who were active in AAWAZ forums. In their new role as social mobilisers, Aagahi Centre resource people built on their existing social capital and networks to manage the risks of community outreach for Tabeer in politically sensitive and highly patriarchal locations.

The result was a higher rate of voter registration than other similar programmes. In the six months prior to the 2018 elections, the two main voter registration campaigns were the one run by ECP, supported by the UNDP and implemented through a NGO called FAFEN (Free and Fair Election Network), and the Tabeer programme run through the Aagahi centres. Together they registered 4.3 million women, whereas in the previous three years a total of only 4.8 million women had been registered (interview D. Nance, 6 December 2019, Islamabad, Ayesha Khan; DFID 2018a). Tabeer used Aagahi centres in 45 districts of KP and Punjab to help 184,107 women and transgender persons acquire CNICs (DAI 2019: 13). FAFEN employed a model of subcontracting other NGOs and CSOs for its campaign, whereas Tabeer's use of pre-existing Aagahi centres proved to be more efficient and cost effective (interview A. Goraya, 6 December 2020, Islamabad, Ayesha Khan).

After AAWAZ came to an end, DAI absorbed some of its senior managers into Tabeer. One programme manager currently heads the women voter registration campaign, and other AAWAZ district managers became cluster coordinators for the campaign. Civil society members of the AAWAZ village, union council and district forums became informal social mobilisers for the campaign. Although both programmes operated in KP and Punjab, targeting many of the same communities, CDIP had national coverage.

Relationships with government officials, such as those represented on AAWAZ's District Coordination Committees, were leveraged to gain ECP and NADRA support for the voter registration campaign to continue even after the closure of the Aagahi centres. AAWAZ staff, such as district managers, and forum members joined the government DVECs, which were a key site of CDIP engagement with government and citizen representatives. CDIP staff members participated in DVEC meetings. However, with the end of both AAWAZ and CDIP support to Aagahi centres, a valuable resource and successful community engagement model has been lost (interview A. Goraya, 6 December 2020) to the detriment of the overall goals of both programmes.

## 10. Monitoring and evaluating empowerment and accountability

This section examines how AAWAZ and CDIP used their monitoring and evaluation systems to document and analyse whether and how their programmes contributed to empowerment and accountability. DAI's adaptive approach responded to inputs from consortium partners and field staff which led to key changes in the design of AAWAZ. Although CDIP did not measure the dynamics of change, as AAWAZ did, the indicators used to measure overall impact were similar across both programmes.

AAWAZ initially had a Programme Analysis, Research and Results (PARR) framework, which was managed by a local development and research organisation. DAI then modified its approach and brought in a Deputy Team Leader who became more directly active in Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) (interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020). The consortium partners were closely engaged in the internal monitoring and submitted quarterly reports to DAI (DFID 2011). They monitored the community-based organisations and local NGOs with whom they had sub-contracted activities, and any constraints faced by these staff were highlighted and considered when strategising (interview S. U. Khan, 17 January 2020). This was part of the programme's adaptive approach.

The programme operated on the notion that social change is not linear. The AAWAZ Deputy Team Leader explained that the work was based on the concept of the 'spiral of change', from individual level, to household level, to community level and further. When programme staff decided to track behavioural change more closely after the inception phase, they documented the formation of 'women leaders' and 'change makers' through the programme (interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020). Value for money was integrated into AAWAZ in 2015 forming the basis of a cost benefit analysis of the programme. This led to changes in the key assumptions and log frame indicators (DFID 2018a).

**Table 10.1 AAWAZ output indicators**

<b>Output 1 Women's Participation</b>	<b>Output 2 Conflict Pre-emption</b>	<b>Output 3 Improved Service Delivery</b>	<b>Output 4 Generating Evidence</b>
<p>1. Number of women and girls participating in awareness raising sessions and change maker training on participation in public spaces and political processes and women's right to freedom from violence and receiving change-agent training (data disaggregated by location/exclusion)</p> <p>2. Number of men and boys participating in awareness raising sessions and change maker training on the role of male socialisation as root causes of gender inequality, women's right to freedom from violence and participation in public spaces and political processes and receiving change-agent training</p> <p>3. Number of men and boys who are</p>	<p>1. Number of women and men informed about support mechanisms and provided with awareness on non-violent communication and valuing diversity, particularly religious minorities (data disaggregated by location/youth/exclusion)</p> <p>2. Number of women, men and socially excluded citizens positively impacted by AAWAZ forum interventions/ members' actions to protect them from discrimination, harmful cultural practices &amp; violence (sectarian, gender, religious etc)</p> <p>3. Percentage of people in programme areas who consider community pre-emption and</p>	<p>1. Number of women and socially excluded citizens informed of rights, procedures and hotlines for accessing and demanding improved delivery of services from public officials and political representatives</p> <p>2. Number and types of demands raised with public officials and political representatives in education, health and other priority areas benefiting women, girls and other excluded groups (data disaggregated by location/gender/nature of issues)</p> <p>3. Cumulative number of demonstrable changes in policy and implementation by local/provincial government in response to public demands where there is attribution to</p>	<p>1. Effective evidence-based (qualitative/quantitative) M&amp;E systems established</p> <p>2. Number of quality evidence-based research commissioned on select thematic issues and disseminated for policy and practice</p> <p>3. Cumulative number and types of quality advocacy campaigns initiated by AAWAZ, consolidated, synthesised and analysed by PARR</p> <p>4. Number of women and men who are in AAWAZ forums demonstrating knowledge on AAWAZ's research and communication products and campaign themes. Cumulative number of</p>

<p>in AAWAZ forums demonstrating:</p> <p>a. Knowledge on the role of male socialisation, masculinity, power, modern slavery, privilege and control as root causes of gender inequality;</p> <p>b. Communication skills – to listen to girls and women with attention and compassion, and without judgment, advice or interruptions; and</p> <p>c. Improved relationship skills - involving girls and women in decision making.</p> <p>4. Number of women actively participating in AAWAZ forums and public events and in leadership positions</p> <p>5. Number of youth leaders with improved skills and supported to challenge discriminatory social norms in AAWAZ communities</p>	<p>cohesion mechanisms to be credible and effective</p> <p>4. Number of women and excluded group members participating in AAWAZ Forums' local level peace building initiatives (data disaggregated by gender and religion)</p>	<p>AAWAZ, a proportion of which reflect the voice of women and other socially excluded groups</p>	<p>adaptations in implementation and policy, and demonstration of good practice attributable to AAWAZ products.</p>
--	--	---	---

The AAWAZ 2017 log frame lists key indicators for the overall impact, outcome and for each output. The indicators were used to measure how the programme contributed to empowerment (particularly for women and marginalised groups) and accountability (DFID 2017a). The impact indicators include a number for Pakistanis who feel quite or very safe over the course of a year (based on the national survey conducted by Gallup on 'Polling on Crimes, Violence, Terrorism and Social Evils'), the voice and accountability score from the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and Pakistan's Gender Gap rank. The overall outcome indicators include the number of laws supporting women or excluded groups' rights on which progress is made, the proportion of men and women who report a change in their knowledge, attitude and practices regarding the participation of women in political and public spheres and violence against women and girls, the percentage of girls, women and excluded groups who report a use of and satisfaction with key public services (education, health and sanitation), and the number of people supported to have choice and control over their own development and to hold decision-makers to account.

Specific indicators for the four main outputs are listed in Table 10.1 above. They measure activities and inputs, as well as the change in targeted individuals, such as women active in forums as opposed to only participating, the number of people positively impacted by AAWAZ interventions regarding forced marriages and domestic violence, and the number of households impacted by improved service delivery achieved through the programme.

The key indicators measuring the overall impact of CDIP are similar to those of AAWAZ. They are the democracy index score from the World Democracy Index from The Economist Intelligence Unit, the voice and accountability score from the WGI and the Global Gender Gap Index (DFID 2018b). The indicators for the programme's four main outputs are listed in Table 10.2, along with a few examples of activities measured under those outputs. While AAWAZ's indicators included those measuring changes in behaviour, the CDIP indicators mainly measure inputs and activities rather than dynamics of change (DFID 2018c).

CDIP's post-April 2018 Annual Review reports that the programme monitors any CSOs it engages with via monthly and quarterly progress reports. The third-party monitoring of the programme is conducted through Ecorys (research and consulting company), Annual Reviews and an independent impact evaluation, which was underway at that time (DFID 2018c). The programme's district level staff for the women voter registration campaign participates in monthly review meetings held by DAI. The constraints faced by the programme's social mobilisers within the field are discussed during this meeting (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). The Annual Review process involves reviewing programme documents, discussions with the programme team, and meetings with relevant government actors (DFID 2018c).

**Table 10.2 CDIP output indicators**

<b>Output 1 Election Management</b>	<b>Output 2 Parliamentary Processes</b>	<b>Output 3 Political Parties</b>	<b>Output 4 Democratic Space</b>
<p>1. ECP's electoral administration and management (capacity-building)</p> <p>2. ECP's institutional capacity (supporting ECP in its strategic plans)</p> <p>3. ECP's internal plans and proposals for promoting electoral participation of women and other socially excluded groups (supporting initiatives such as meetings).</p>	<p>1. Improved capability of the secretariat of the selected parliamentary institutions</p> <p>2. Improved capability and functioning of targeted committees</p> <p>3. Improved capability and functioning of cross-party fora (caucuses and SDGs task forces)</p> <p>4. Improved constituency outreach.</p>	<p>1. Political parties' inclusion of youth, women and other socially excluded groups</p> <p>2. Evidence-based and inclusive policy making by political parties</p> <p>3. Criteria-based selection of candidates by political parties.</p> <p>4. Understanding and compliance of Elections Act and Pakistan's international commitments by the selected political parties.</p>	<p>1. Women's CNICs and voter registration</p> <p>2. CSOs effectively engage with democratic institutions on civic and political rights/issues (establishing the Innovation and Research Fund)</p> <p>3. Improve policy regime and coordination in the human rights eco-system in Pakistan (UNDP-SELP) (consultations on human rights and capacity building of human rights officials)</p> <p>4. Dialogue and debate on enabling free, independent and responsible media (facilitating dialogues with policy makers on media freedom).</p>

Source: DFID 2019b

## 11. Negotiating shrinking civic space

We now examine how the programmes contributed to creating an enabling environment for social and political action in support of empowerment and accountability, by focusing on how they developed partnerships with non-state actors in civil society. Through exercising support to these actors, the programmes effectively addressed the problem of elite capture of voices in local settings and maintained local citizen ability to demand accountability. However, increasing constraints on civic spaces and the absence of robust local government undermined the long-term gains of these initiatives after the AAWAZ forums came to an end.

Growing restrictions on civic society space increased in pace during 2017, enhancing risks and widening the gulf between citizens and government bodies during both programmes' life cycles ((interview U. Khanzada, 6 December 2019). The current absence of local government and shrinking civic space have made it more challenging to build upon the achievements of programmes such as AAWAZ and CDIP. One expert who has worked on both programmes with DAI, believes that today civic space has shrunk so much that instead of challenging laws and serving as a watchdog, now the focus of civil society activism is on adhering to or implementing existing laws. 'The military and agencies have a role in the government and it cannot be challenged now. Even the media is not free' (interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019).

When AAWAZ began its work in the districts they had to obtain NOCs from the Punjab and KP provincial governments, even though DAI was the implementing agency and they were working with four major national NGOs. By the middle of the programme, the provincial governments started insisting on being notified about every activity (interview U. Khanzada, 6 December 2019). AAWAZ was disallowed from working in some areas of district Mianwali in Punjab (interview M. Shahbaz, 6 February 2020). The NOC process proved time-consuming and onerous, making it one of the biggest challenges facing the programme. In Multan district two implementing consortia members (SPO and SAP-PK) eventually had their own NOCs withdrawn (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019).

CDIP did not subcontract any organisations for the voter registration campaign because of the shrinking civic space and increased NOC requirements. DAI, as a corporate entity and implementing partner was subject to fewer requirements for permission than a civil society organisation. Building on its advantage of fewer operational risks, it was still able to use AAWAZ human resources to facilitate a successful campaign for voter registration under CDIP. Respondents note this was a key factor in their success, given that the restrictions on civil

society would have prevented them from achieving their targets by requiring NOCs for each activity. They only used the sub-grant model to fund CSOs for the campaign in FATA because they had no cluster coordinators in place in these areas (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020).

Security and intelligence agencies nevertheless remain a significant challenge for civil society organisations, the more so if they receive donor programme funding. One CDIP campaign leader with experience of working in both KP and Punjab observed that CSOs need to avoid seeing themselves as parallel to the state and become more transparent and accountable in order to avoid hurdles. The district of Multan is marked as a red-zone by security agencies, because of the proliferation of extremist organisations based in South Punjab. Security agencies even picked up AAWAZ staff members for questioning, sent police to stop their activities, and stopped hotels from hosting programme events. Yet due to SPO's good reputation and standing in communities, based on its previous years of work, the state did not ban the programme altogether (interview K. Fayyaz, 14 January 2020). Engagement from higher levels – government officials, board members of consortium partner NGOs, and others was needed on various occasions to push back security agencies (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019).

Lack of government responsiveness to citizen initiatives may reflect this growing distrust of citizen action. People mobilised through AAWAZ complain of sending in applications, emboldened by awareness of the right to information, only to be disheartened by receiving no response from government departments. Since DFID was investing large amounts of money on health and education support within these districts, the government was not as resistant to working with AAWAZ as it could have been, yet there was still no real change in terms of accountability (interview M. Mughal, 19 December 2019). NADRA, the government body that issues identity cards and registers voters, has been accused of distrusting NGOs and confusing AAWAZ programme staff with NGO work. During Taber's voter registration campaign it became helpful for workers to affiliate themselves with the Election Commission of Pakistan as a means of validation and protection in the field. The role that CDIP played to establish a strong working relationship between NADRA and ECP helped to expedite voter registration and add credibility to campaign efforts, further mitigating the risks to actors on the ground.

In Pakistan the cost of shrinking civic space may be higher than in other contexts because of the important role civil society organisations play in empowerment and accountability efforts. Respondents observe that shrinking space is weakening the social contract and democratic governance. In order to optimise the work of CSOs one option is to work at the grassroots more actively through political parties and the use of digital platforms to amplify citizen voice (interview

N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020). Meanwhile DFID and other donors now prefer to work with organisations which can obtain NOCs, although leading advocacy NGOs with years of experience are finding their permissions withdrawn. One expert believes donors and CSOs need to come together to advocate against government curtailing the role of civil society (interview S. Khan, 17 January 2020).

## 11.1 Adapting to risk and security concerns

All donor programmes in Pakistan are forced to contend with the implications of closing civic spaces for achieving their goals. Increased scrutiny by intelligence agencies and government restrictions on NGOs emerged towards the end of AAWAZ. Programme staff were on occasion taken away for investigation by police or intelligence officials. CDIP faces similar constraints in its engagement with civil society, as a result DAI no longer subcontracts any NGOs or CBOs for its women voter registration campaign, although it initially did so when it worked through the Aagahi centres (interview N. T. Ali, 4 February 2020).

At times DFID was required to exercise its influence with government and the bureaucracy in Pakistan in order to overcome political hurdles that DAI faced in implementing AAWAZ in certain districts. The design of AAWAZ 2 has been responsive to the growing discomfiture in government with citizen engagement programmes, by engaging with UN agencies, thus reducing the suspicion the state may have with its agenda (interview Z. Noel, 6 December 2019).

## 12. Impact on context and actors for empowerment and accountability

Both programmes helped to nurture active citizenry and promote social cohesion in the face of severe constraints on civil society and weak democratic institutions. It emerged through programme implementation that it was possible to counteract the social and political discord related to the political conflict characterised by growing extremism and militancy through conflict pre-emption activities. Government bodies at the district and local levels gave a mixed response to accountability claims from communities.

AAWAZ forums used peace mapping and power analysis exercises effectively to help identify conflict triggers and pre-emption strategies. A review found the exercises themselves brought communities together, working as active agents to preserve peace (DFID 2016). Field staff cite examples of bringing inter-faith communities together before religious holidays to discuss ways to avoid clashes during Christmas, *holi*, or Muharram celebrations. Aagahi centre resource people in Multan, from different religious communities, met members of different faiths for the first time during these interactions and began a practice of attending each other's festivals. AAWAZ forum members brought together religious leaders of the two main religious sects, Shias and Sunnis, to preach peace between the two communities (AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus Group Discussion, 13 January 2020). For domestic violence related conflicts, AAWAZ forum members and resource people would engage with the perpetrator's family members, community elders and local religious leaders to collectively pressure him to change his behaviour (AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus Group Discussion, 13 January 2020). Even when AAWAZ shifted its conflict focus to the prevention of domestic violence, field research in both districts showed it was able to carry out its activities without insurmountable obstacles from within communities.

The AAWAZ structure built upon the experience, credibility, networks and social capital of leading development NGOs in Pakistan. DAI entered into formal partnerships with four of these NGOs, which in turn worked with CBOs in the districts they managed. The AAWAZ Team Leader at DAI was a former chief executive with SPO, one of the AAWAZ consortium partners, and a prominent civil society activist. All four national partner NGOs brought their experience of building local networks and a framing of empowerment and accountability to bear on how AAWAZ was designed and implemented (interview H. Khalique, 5 December 2019; interview N. Khalid, 17 January 2020). These organisations, in particular Aurat Foundation, had a history of leading rights-based advocacy in Pakistan along with experience in community mobilisation.

Thus, individuals engaged with AAWAZ straddled civil society activism in their personal and professional engagement. Team Leader Khalique explained his vision of the programme was to mobilise a grass-roots women's movement, shifting from what he saw as an upper class and urban bias to the current women's movement in Pakistan. Mumtaz Mughal, who led Aurat Foundation's collaboration with AAWAZ, was herself a senior activist with the women's movement.

AAWAZ led to significant capacity-building of CBOs and human resource development amongst individuals in communities (interview S. U. Khan, 17 January 2020). Due to the growing difficulty for civil society organisations to overcome registration requirements and obtain NOCs, the second phase of AAWAZ is unlikely to collaborate with many of the same national or local organisations whose capacity was enhanced during the first phase.

The programme engaged locals in each district who were familiar with the cultural norms and context, and as a result did not encounter high levels of community resistance. Instead, they reported the resistance came from institutions. For example, when communities raised demands about mismanagement in government schools, these institutions resisted accountability and there was backlash. Other institutions exhibiting resistance included local hospitals, Basic Health Units, and any government institutions they approached for information under the Right to Information Act (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019).

The AAWAZ consortium partners and women in the communities report the biggest barriers to mobilising women were patriarchal cultural norms, and resistance from local influential and religious scholars. From the village level up, AAWAZ worked with the male family and household members of the mobilised women, to sensitize both about the rights of women. Thus, both men and women reported stories of personal transformation (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019).

At first, when AAWAZ encouraged women to take their applications for assistance to government departments, the women were reluctant. Both women district managers and community representatives found officials dismissive, usually only their male colleagues were taken seriously. One strategy to counter this was the *khuli katcheri*- open courts that included government representatives and heard complaints from amongst the public. Engaging in these *katcheris* improved women's confidence and sensitised officials to take them seriously (CDIP Cluster Coordinators Focus Group Discussion, 19 December 2019). An absent local government during part of AAWAZ's duration limited its efficiency

(AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons Focus Group Discussion, 13 January 2020).

The programmes interacted synergistically to achieve high impact in the area of increased women's political participation. For AAWAZ this was a component of its broader approach to gender empowerment, whereas for CDIP increasing women's voter registration was a component of its commitment to increasing citizen participation in democratic processes. Aagahi centre resource people developed skills and networks which were both personally empowering and also often leveraged for CDIP's voter registration work after AAWAZ ended. The interaction effect of the two programmes strengthened women's capacity to counter patriarchal and elite capture of democratic processes at the local level by providing them opportunities to engage with elected officials and participate in voting.

The broader context for gender empowerment and democratic consolidation in Pakistan has undermined the programmes' goals in the long run. Closing civil society space and increased government distrust of social and political action has led to a clampdown against activists involved in contentious politics. The religious right has taken political and legal steps to curb the nationwide feminist marches on International Women's Day, known as the Aurat Marches, which demand gender empowerment and an end to sexual violence and harassment. Local government elections in KP and Punjab are delayed, while debates over the delimitation of new constituencies based on the latest census results are likely to delay elections in Sindh.

## 13. Conclusion

The two UK-funded programmes compared in this empirical study provide valuable lessons for how a major donor enables and supports social and political action for empowerment and accountability in a fragile context such as Pakistan. The two programmes were designed to work in synergy with significant overlap in their goals. Their interaction effects emerged clearly at multiple levels. First, both CDIP and AAWAZ were based on PEA and CAR analysis of the context and shared a similar vision in support of stabilising and consolidating an inclusive democracy in Pakistan. Second it was both fortuitous, and strategic that DAI served as implementing partner in both programmes. This was critical to ensuring that the demand-side of CDIP used the programme structure and human resources of AAWAZ to good effect, which was the third level of interaction. This continued even after the AAWAZ programme came to an end, through Tabeer's funding of Aagahi centres, and its later hiring of Aagahi centre resource people, to achieve its demand-side goals of increased women's voter registration.

Donor programmes to nurture civil society space and empower citizens appear even more valuable where the gains of a democratic transition may be rapidly slipping away. Due to the drivers of Pakistan's fragility, external pressures on democratic spaces and civil society remained high during the two programmes' life cycles, therefore enhancing the external donor's value in enabling an environment for citizen voice in social and political action. Both programmes' partnerships with major civil society organisations and actors were vital to maintaining civic spaces and facilitating citizen relationships with government actors to promote accountability, thus ensuring a positive impact on the local context. Although CDIP creatively built upon the local human resource developed by AAWAZ, the citizen's forums set up by the latter programme ceased to exist after it ended. This may not have been a setback to AAWAZ's gains towards nurturing citizen engagement with democratic processes if elected local bodies were empowered and functional in the meantime, but this is not the case. New local government elections in both Punjab and KP have been pending since 2019. In June 2020 DFID itself was merged into the UK Foreign Office, now renamed the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). The structure of CSSF programming will evolve alongside this major development. CDIP will have another phase, as improving governance and strong inclusive institutions in Pakistan remain key objectives for the UK, however the details are as yet unclear.

To sustain its work today any external actor engaged in supporting citizen action and nurturing democratic space will need to balance the need for a good working relationship with the government with its commitment to citizen empowerment. In

the process, it will need to ensure its existing programmes remain both adaptive and closely interactive to leverage the human resources on the ground built up over years of engagement with civil society organisations and the communities in which they are embedded.

## Annexe 1

### A1 Donor programmes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab

**Table A1.1 Donor programmes in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab**

Organisation	Programme	Major outcomes	Implementing partners
World Bank	Economic Revitalisation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (2011-2020), US\$ 20000000	Economic recovery and revitalisation of the crisis affected areas of KP and FATA by creating sustainable employment opportunities through rehabilitation of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).	Government of Pakistan, FATA/Merged Area Secretariat, SMEDA KP, Department of Industries
World Bank	KP/FATA Governance Reforms, (2011-2016), US\$8,750,000	To strengthen the capacity of the government departments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, FATA and Balochistan.	FATA Secretariat, Government of Balochistan & KP
World Bank	FATA Temporarily Displaced Persons Emergency Recovery Project, (2017-N/A), US\$114 million	To assist in the early recovery of families affected by the militancy crisis, promote child health, and strengthen emergency response safety net delivery systems in FATA.	Government of Pakistan, NADRA
World Bank	KP Southern Area Development Project, (2013-2019), US\$ 18 million	To strengthen the capacity of the poor to improve their livelihood options through access to social and productive infrastructure using participatory approaches in the selected southern districts of KP.	KP provincial govt depts. Local Government, Elections & Rural Development Department, Economic Affairs Division

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Programme</b>	<b>Major outcomes</b>	<b>Implementing partners</b>
World Bank	FATA Rural Livelihoods and Community Infrastructure Project (RLCIP), (2012-2018), US\$12000000	To improve livelihoods & access to basic service infrastructure in FATA.	FATA Secretariat
European Union	Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) (2014-2017), EUR4,998,000	Strengthen Government, media and civil society capacity to implement and monitor programmes with demonstrable impact against extremism and violence.	German (GIZ) GMBH
European Union	Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and of returnees in Afghanistan (2015-2017), EUR45,692,673	The overall objective is to contribute to the protection of Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan and returnees in Afghanistan, and to promote the search for durable solutions.	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
European Union	Strengthening community-based measures to curb VAWG (2014-2017), EUR509,091	Contribute to enhanced social and collective action in local communities to detect, prevent and respond to VAWG, specifically domestic violence & forced marriage. KP and Punjab.	KirkensNodhjelpForening
USAID	Strengthening Rule of Law (2011-2019) US\$9,064,472 (DFID: \$1,410,000)	Strengthened capacity of courts, increased access to justice, improved police services, legal aid & representation mechanism for men, women and other vulnerable groups in KP. (KP)	UNDP
USAID	FATA Transition & Recovery (2015-2021) US\$25,097,291 (DFID: \$1,585,000)	Support government in contributing to economic, social and political stability in FATA (FATA).	UNDP

<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Programme</b>	<b>Major outcomes</b>	<b>Implementing partners</b>
USAID	FATA Governance Project (2018-2022) US\$5,420,310 (DFID: \$5,240,000)	Build capacity for effective agency/district level governance, provide technical assistance to policy-making at federal, provincial & agency level. (FATA)	UNDP
USAID	Strengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes (2011-2020) US\$7,746,864 (DFID: \$1,740,000)	Technical assistance to ECP, Electoral laws and procedures strengthened, improved engagement of citizens, particularly women and youth, in electoral processes. (KP and Punjab).	UNDP
SDC, DFID, Govt. of Germany	Decentralisation and Local Governance (2012-2022), US\$2,768,125	Strengthening local governance mechanisms and creating an enabling environment for rights-based development.	UNDP
Norway & JapanGovts	Youth and Social Cohesion project (2015-2021), US\$1,635,323	Enable communities in conflict-prone areas of KP to mitigate conflict & strengthen social cohesion.	UNDP
UN Trust Fund for Human Security, Govt. of Switzerland	Community Resilience - Vulnerability Reduction, Improved Cohesion and Empowerment (2013-2019), US\$1,037,915	Restore livelihood of refugees, rehabilitate community infrastructure and enhance social cohesion.	UNDP

Source: Authors' own

## Annexe 2

### A2 List and number of interviews

**Table A2.1 List and number of interviews**

Level	Name of Programme		
	CDIP	AAWAZ I	AAWAZ II
<b>DFID</b>			
Senior Responsible Officers (SROs)	1		2
<b>Implementing Partner</b>			
Team Leader	1	1	1
Deputy Team Leader		1	
Team Member	3		1
<b>Partner NGOs</b>			
National Manager		3	
<b>District and Union Council Staff</b>			
District Managers		3	
Resource Persons		3	
<b>Government Committees</b>			
District Voter Education Committee	2		
<b>Citizen Forums</b>			
AAWAZ District, Union Council, and Village Forums		6	
<b>Government Officials</b>			
Election Commission, NADRA, Union Councillors		5	
<b>Partner Donor</b>			
UNDP (SELP)	3		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>3</b>

## Annexe 3

### A3 Interviews and focus group discussions

AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons (2020) *Focus Group Discussion*, facilitated by K. Qidwai, 16 January, Dera Ismail Khan

AAWAZ Aagahi Centre Resource Persons (2020) *Focus Group Discussion*, facilitated by A. Khan, 13 January, Multan

AAWAZ District Forum Members (2020) *Focus Group Discussion*, facilitated by S. Javed, 16 January, Dera Ismail Khan

AAWAZ Forum Members (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai and S. Javed, 13 January, Multan

Ali, N.T. (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai, 4 February, Karachi

Fayyaz, K. (2020) Interviewed by A. Khan, 14 January, Multan

Goraya, A. (2020) Interviewed by A. Khan, 6 December, Islamabad

Jilani, J. (2020) Correspondence with A. Khan, 6 October

Khalid, N. (2020) Interviewed by A. Khan, 17 January, Karachi

Khalique, H. (2019) Interviewed by A. Khan, 5 December, Karachi

Khan, S. (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai and S. Javed, 17 January, Dera Ismail Khan

Khan, S. U. (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai and S. Javed, 17 January, Dera Ismail Khan

Khanzada, U. (2019) Interviewed by A. Khan, 6 December, Islamabad

Mughal, M. (2019) Interviewed by K. Qidwai, 19 December, Islamabad

Nance, D. (2019) Interviewed by A. Khan, 6 December, Islamabad

Noel, Z. (2019) Interviewed by A. Khan, 6 December, Islamabad

Shahbaz, M. (2020) Interviewed by K. Qidwai, 6 February, Karachi (telephone)

## References

- Adeney, K. (2017) 'How to Understand Pakistan's Hybrid Regime: The Importance of a Multidimensional Continuum', *Democratization* 24.1: 119-37, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2015.1110574
- Aftab, S. and Taj, A. (2015) *Migration of Minorities in Pakistan: A Case Study Analysis*, Islamabad: AAWAZ Programme, Development Alternatives Inc (DAI)
- Aurat Foundation (2020), **Aurat Foundation - About AF** (accessed 30 March 2020)
- CDIP Cluster Coordinators (2019) *Focus Group Discussion*, facilitated by K. Qidwai, 19 December, Murree
- Christie, A. and Green, D. (2019) *The Case for an Adaptive Approach to Empowerment and Accountability Programming in Fragile Settings*, Synthesis Report, Itad and Oxfam in association with IDS
- CIVICUS (2018) '**Human Rights Activists Abducted and Ill-treated for Protesting Against Illegal Occupation of Lakes**', CIVICUS (accessed 11 February 2020)
- CIVICUS (2017) '**Little Room for Dissent in Pakistan: Civic Freedoms under Constant Attack**', CIVICUS (accessed 11 February 2020)
- CIVICUS (2016) **Pakistan Overview**, CIVICUS (accessed 11 February 2020)
- DAI (2019) *DAI-Tabeer's Consolidated Report on Election Support*, Islamabad: Development Alternatives Inc
- DAI (2015) *AAWAZ Theory of Change*, Islamabad: Development Alternatives Inc
- Decruz-Young, N. and Anderson, C. (2019) *A4EA Unpacking Donor Action Workstream - Annotated Bibliography on Workstream Research Methods*, Action for Empowerment and Accountability Programme, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies
- DFID (2019) Logical Framework: Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2018a) Programme Completion Review: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, June, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2018b) Logical Framework: Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2018c) Annual Review: Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2017a) Logical Framework: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2017b) Annual Review: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2016) Annual Review: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2015) Annual Review: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2014a) Programme Completion Review: Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes in Pakistan, June, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2014b) Annual Review: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2013a) Inception Report: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme. Inception Report. London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2013b) Annual Review: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, London: Department for International Development
- DFID (2011) Business Case: AAWAZ Voice and Accountability Programme, August. London: Department for International Development

- DFID (2010) *Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper*, London: Department for International Development
- Economist Intelligence Unit (2018) *Democracy Index 2018: Me Too? – Political Participation, Protest and Democracy*, London: Economist Intelligence Unit
- Esser, D. (2019) *How do DFID E&A Projects in Pakistan Work Across Scales? Final Report on A4EA Pilot Research in Pakistan*, Action for Empowerment and Accountability Programme: Institute of Development Studies
- Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (2020) **Development Tracker** (accessed April 2020)
- Fox, J. (2020) **'Contested Terrain: International Development Projects and Countervailing Power for the Excluded'**, *World Development* 132: 1-18, DOI:10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.104978
- Gazdar, H. and Balagamwala, M. (2014) *Impact Evaluation of DFID's Electoral Programmes in Pakistan*, Karachi: Collective for Social Science Research
- Hasan, M. (2018) **'Attempts to Maneuver Polls Unacceptable: HRCP'**, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (accessed 2 March 2020)
- Hausmann, R., Tyson, L. D. and Zahidi, S. (2011) *The Global Gender Gap Report 2011*, Geneva: World Economic Forum
- Holland, J. and Thirkell, A. with Trepanier E. and Earle L. (2009) *Measuring Change and Results in Voice and Accountability Work*, DFID Working Paper 34, London: Department for International Development
- Hossain, N., Khurana, N., Mohmand, S., Nazneen, S., Oosterom, M., Roberts, T., Santos, R., Shankland, A. and Schröder, P. (2018) **What Does Closing Civic Space Mean for Development? A Literature Review and Proposed Conceptual Framework**, IDS Working Paper 515, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies (accessed 18 January 2021)
- Insan Foundation Trust (2013) *Responding to Disputes and Conflicts: KP and Punjab*, Islamabad: AAWAZ Programme, Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI)
- International Crisis Group (2016) *Pakistan's Jihadist Heartland: Southern Punjab*, Brussels: International Crisis Group
- Janjua, J. and Noel, Z. (2015) *Shia-Sunni Conflict in Pakistan: Community Mechanisms for Resolution*, Islamabad: AAWAZ Programme, DAI
- Janjua, M.J. (2015) *Discrimination in the Legal Profession: Attitudes and Perceptions of Minorities and the Majority*, Islamabad: AAWAZ Programme, DAI
- Javid, H. (2019) 'Winning 'Friends' and 'Influencing' People: Democratic Consolidation and Authoritarianism in Punjab', *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 58.1: 139-59, DOI:10.1080/14662043.2020.1700024
- Khan, A. (2018) *The Women's Movement in Pakistan: Activism, Islam and Democracy*, London: Bloomsbury
- Khan, I. A. (2019) **LG Polls without Census Notification Open to Legal Challenges: Experts**, DAWN, 29 December (accessed 25 February 2020)
- Khan, M. S. (2019) **'Empowerment without Accountability? The Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan and its Aftershocks'**, *IDS Bulletin* 50.3: 53-72, DOI: 10.19088/1968-2019.130 (accessed 18 January 2021)
- Khan, O. A. (2001) 'Critical Engagements: NGOs and the State' in Anita M. Weiss and S. Z. Gilani (eds), *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan*, Karachi: Oxford University Press
- Mehboob, S. R. (2011) *Governance and Militancy in Pakistan's Southern Punjab Region*, CSIS Background Paper
- Mohmand, S. K. (2019) **The Implications of Closing Civic Space for Sustainable Development in Pakistan**, IDS Working Paper 521, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies
- Naqeeb, B. (2006) *SPO – A Brief History*, Islamabad: Strengthening Participatory Organization
- Osaghae, E. E. (2007) 'Fragile States', *Development in Practice* 17.4-5: 691-99, DOI:10.1080/09614520701470060
- Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (2017) *Province wise Provincial Results of Census - 2017*, Islamabad: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics

**Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016, National Assembly** (accessed 11 February 2020)

**Protection of Pakistan Act 2014, National Assembly** (accessed 11 February 2020)

South Asia Partnership Pakistan (2020) **History, South Asia Partnership Pakistan** (accessed 30 March 2020)

Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), *NUI Galway, Ipsos Mori, and International Centre for Research on Women (ICRW) (2019) Economic and Social Costs of Violence Against Women in Pakistan: Summary Report*, Galway: NUI Galway

South Asia Terrorism Portal (2020) **Sectarian Violence in Pakistan: 1989-2018**, SATP (accessed 14 February 2020)

Trading Economics (2020) **Pakistan GDP Growth Rate, Trading Economics** (accessed 23 March 2020)

Transparency International (2020) **Corruption Perceptions Index 2019**, Transparency International (accessed 11 February 2020)

UNDP (2020) **Pakistan Human Development Indicators**, United Nations Development Programme (accessed 11 February 2020)

UNDP (2019) *Inequalities in Human Development in the 21st Century, Briefing Note for Countries on the 2019 Human Development Report*, New York: United Nations Development Programme

UNDP (2017) *Pakistan Human Development Index Report 2017*, New York: United Nations Development Programme

UNDP (2011) *Human Development Report 2011*, New York: United Nations Development Programme

United States Department of State (2013) **2012 Report on International Religious Freedom - Pakistan**, Refworld (accessed 14 February 2020)

Warraich, S. (2019) **'Pakistan's Troubled Local Governance'** *TNS The News on Sunday*, 20 October (accessed 25 February 2020)

World Bank (2020) **GDP Growth (Annual %) - Pakistan**, World Bank, (accessed 11 February 2020)



Delivering world-class research, learning and teaching that transforms the knowledge, action and leadership needed for more equitable and sustainable development globally.

Institute of Development Studies  
Library Road  
Brighton, BN1 9RE  
United Kingdom  
+44 (0)1273 606261  
[ids.ac.uk](http://ids.ac.uk)

Charity Registration Number 306371  
Charitable Company Number 877338  
© Institute of Development Studies 2021